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MISCELLANEOUS
9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil Sec. 2537. p. 598 (19~: .

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this Court arises under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue 1:

Propriety of JNOV When JNOV Argument Was Not Made in
Support of Directed Verdict:

Is Smith's precluded from arguing that the trial correct abused its
discretion in denying Smith's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict when the argument Smith's made in support of that motion was
not made in support of Smith's Motion for Directed Verdict?
A motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict "is technically only a renewal of the
motion for directed verdict made at the close of the evidence, it cannot assert a ground that was
not included in the motion for directed verdict." 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil Sec. 2537. p. 598 (1971); Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) ("a party who has
moved for a directed verdict may move [for judgment notwithstanding the verdict] in accordance
with his motion for a directed verdict." (emphasis added)), See also, e.g., Chavez v. Tolleson
Elementary School Dist., 592 P.2d 1017 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (judgment n.o.v. could not be
granted on ground not raised in motion for directed verdict); Security Pacific Housing Services,
Inc. v. Friddle, 866 S.W.2d 375 (Ark. 1993) (same); Thomas v. Holt, 471 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996) (same); Stewart v. Brennan, 748 P.2d 816 (Haw. Ct. App. 1988) (same).

1

Issue 2:

Failure to Marshal the Evidence:

Has Smith's met its burden of marshaling the evidence sufficient to even
allow this Court to address whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Smith's post trial motions?
In order to challenge a trial court's findings of fact, a party has a duty
to marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them clearly erroneous.
Appellants often overlook or disregard this heavy burden. When the duty to
marshal is not properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of challenges
to the findings and accept the findings as valid.
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Issue 3:

Trial Court's Denial of Smith's Post-Judgment Motions:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Smith's motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for new trial, and/or for remittitur
when the trial court, having presided over the trial and viewed the
evidence, found that there was ample evidence to support the jury's award
of damages; found that the jury had not acted under the influence of
passion or prejudice; and found that Smith's had not demonstrated that
Mr. Harness had failed to make reasonable efforts to mitigate his
damages?
A party is not entitled to a JNOV unless, viewing all of the evidence and indulging all
inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no evidence to support the
jury's determination. See, e ^ , Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah
1996). In determining a motion for JNOV, the Court does not weigh the evidence. E.g., Winters
v. W.S. Hatch Company, 546 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1976). The trial court's denial of a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for a new trial or for remittitur is reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard. Goddard v. Hickman, 658 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984) (The trial court

2

"has broad latitude in granting or denying a motion for a new trial and will not be overturned on
appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.,,); accord State v. Pena, 869 P.2d~936, 938 (Utah 1994);
see also Benson v. Denver & Rio Grande Western RR Co., 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 P.2d 790, 794-95
(1955) (court must exercise "sound judicial discretion" in ruling on JNOV).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
David Harness ("Mr. Harness") was employed by Nabisco as a sales representative. Mr.
Harness broke his right leg and shattered his left foot when he fell from a shelf located in the
back room of a grocery store owned by Smith Food & Drug Centers, Inc. ("Smith's") located in
Kearns, Utah.
After undergoing rehabilitation for approximately six months following the accident, Mr.
Harness attempted to return to his job. After several months, however, Mr. Harness, with the
concurrence of his surgeon, Dr. Schow, was forced to stop working. As a result of the accident,
Mr. Harness was permanently disabled and the only work he could possibly qualify to do was
desk-type work. His doctor recommended a medical retirement. Mr. Harness has no college
education, he was fifty-three years old when the accident occurred, he suffers constant pain, he
cannot stand for long periods of time, he walks only with the assistance of a cane or crutches, he
cannot type, he does not know how to operate a computer, and he lacks other marketable job
skills. While before the accident Mr. Harness was physically fit and regularly engaged in a
variety of sports and physical activities, he now cannot engage in any activities that require
significant physical exertion.

Mr. Harness' case was tried to a jury on March 10-13, 1998. The jury unanimously
found that Smith's was negligent and assessed 80% fault to Smith's and 20% fault to Mr.
Harness. The jury unanimously awarded Mr. Harness damages of $545,492.56 (after adjustment
for comparative fault) in lost income, lost earning capacity, loss of household services, and
medical expenses and damages of $160,000.00 (after adjustment for comparative fault) for pain
and suffering. See R. 485-486 (Judgment).1
Following entry of judgment, Smith's moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or
for new trial or for remittitur The sole focus of Smith's post-judgment motions was that the
damages the jury awarded Mr. Harness were purportedly excessive and unsupported by the
evidence. More precisely, Smith's argued in the trial court (as it argues now) that Mr. Harness
failed to establish at trial that he had made reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages. See R.
495-512 (Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict and Motion for New Trial, or Motion for Remittitur).
Mr. Harness opposed Smith's motions.
memorandum).

See R. 514-537 (Mr. Harness' opposition

A copy of Smith's memorandum in support of its post judgment motions

(Smith's filed no reply) and a copy of Mr. Harness' opposition to Smith's motion are attached as
Exhibit "A" to this Brief. Judge Anne Stirba denied Smith's motion on June 22, 1998. R. 577579. This appeal followed. Because Smith's post judgment motions were untimely, the Utah
Supreme Court, by Order dated October 26, 1998 (R. 598), directed Smith's "to limit its issues

1

"R.

" refers to the record in the trial court.

4

on appeal to those concerning the denial of its post judgment motions." Those issues relate only
to damages. There are no appellate issues concerning liability. A copy of the Supreme Court's
Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "B."
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
David Harness was injured in September of 1989 when he fell from a shelf in the back
room of a Smith's store in Kearns, Utah. TT 137 (Vol. 1, R. 600).2 At the time of the accident,
Mr. Harness was working as a sales representative for Nabisco. TT 137-38 (Vol. 1, R. 600).3

2

"TT
" refers to the trial transcript. "(Vol.
, R.
") refers to the volume of the transcript
cited and the record cite on the lower right hand corner of the cover page of that volume.
3

In an effort to support its arguments, Smith's sets forth fifteen separately-numbered paragraphs
of "facts." Smith's mischaracterizes many of these so-called "facts," and it omits much of the
actual evidence that was introduced at trial that supports the jury's verdict in favor of Mr.
Harness. The "more than $680,000 in lost income" Smith's references in paragraphs four and
nine in fact consisted of actual medical expenses incurred, loss of household services, and lost
income and lost benefits (past and future). Of that total amount, almost half of the damages had
been incurred as of the date of trial due to the fact that the accident happened in 1989. These past
damages involved no discounting back to present value. In fact, were Plaintiff to receive
prejudgment interest on lost income, benefits, and household services between 1989 and the date
of the trial, his damages would be significantly greater than the amount the jury awarded.
Instead, Plaintiff received prejudgment interest on approximately $12,000 in medical expenses
that already had been incurred as of the date of trial. Smith's Statement of Facts, as well as its
unsupported factual assertions scattered throughout its Brief, are replete with unsupported and
inaccurate claims that should be disregarded. Utah R. App. P. 24(e); Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). For example, Smith's states that Jim Black
testified at trial that "neither he nor any of the other people who worked at Nabisco in September
of 1989 were still employed by Nabisco," and that this established that Mr. Harness' future with
Nabisco was speculative. Smith's Brief at p. 7, ^ 10. Smith's mischaracterizes the actual
evidence. Contrary to Smith's assertion, Mr. Black did not testify that all of the people Mr.
Harness worked with at Nabisco had been "organized out." Black testified only that a lot of the
individuals that he and Mr. Harness had worked with at Nabisco were now gone, TT 226-227
(Vol. 2, R. 601), and that he knew of no reason why Mr. Harness' employment with Nabisco
would not have continued but for the accident. TT 229 (Vol. 2, R. 601). Ron Morgan, who also
5

Prior to the accident, Mr. Harness was secure in his job and had won many performance
awards from Nabisco. See, e.g., TT 163-64 (Vol. 1, R. 600). He had been~assigned to a new
sales area - the best in the region, only six months before he was injured, and had received a
prestigious award from Nabisco based on his excellent job performance just a short time before
the accident. TT 138-39, 163-64 (Vol. 1, R. 600). Mr. Harness' employment records
demonstrated that he was one of Nabisco's best sales representatives; that he had Nabisco's most
lucrative sales routes; that he had received various awards and recognition based on his
achievements at work; and that there was no evidence that Mr. Harness would be in jeopardy of
losing his job.
When Mr. Harness fell to the floor, he shattered his left heel and broke the tibia in his
right leg. TT 159 (Vol. 1, R. 600). Dr. Douglas Schow, an orthopedic surgeon, operated on Mr.
Harness following the accident. TT 160 (Vol. 1, R. 600).
Following the initial operation, Dr. Schow told Mr. Harness he would not be able to
return to work. TT 162 (Vol. 1, R. 600). Mr. Harness enjoyed his job with Nabisco and wanted
to return to work. TT 161-62 (Vol. 1, R. 600). Approximately six months after the accident, Mr.
Harness attempted to return to work. TT 161 (Vol. 1, R. 600). Mr. Harness found that he had
not recovered as he had hoped, however, and that, with time, he was getting worse. TT 161 (Vol.

testified at trial, had worked for Nabisco as a sales representative, just like Mr. Harness, for many
years prior to Mr. Harness' accident. TT 136-137 (Vol. 3, R. 602). Mr. Morgan continued to
work for Nabisco in that position until March of 1996, when he retired. Id. Another example is
Smith's claim that Mr. Harness recovered from his injuries. As discussed thoroughly in this
Brief, such claim is unsupported by, and, in fact, completely contrary to, the evidence at trial.

6

1, R. 600). The condition of Mr. Harness' foot deteriorated to a point where he could not walk.
TT 161 (Vol. 1,R. 600).
Mr. Harness and his wife Darlene discussed Mr. Harness trying to obtain a job elsewhere.
From the time he had graduated from high school in 1955, Mr. Harness had worked in the
grocery business. TT 136-38 (Vol. 1, R. 600). In looking at the market, assessing college and
career options, and after contacting the community college, Mr. Harness, together with his wife,
concluded that, given his disability, including constant pain, his age (fifty-five years old), his
lack of college education, and his lack of typing, computer, or other marketable job skills, there
was not a job market reasonably available for him. TT 162-63 (Vol. 1, R. 600); TT 265-66 (Vol.
2, R. 601); TT 270-73 (Vol. 2, R. 601). Mr. Harness had been proud of was he had been able to
accomplish without a college degree, and was devastated by this determination. TT 163 (Vol. 1,
R. 600); TT 265 (Vol. 2, R. 601) (Darlene Harness testifying regarding the impact on Mr.
Harness of his being unable to return to the work force). On one occasion, Mr. Harness told his
wife he would have been better off had he not lived following the accident, because he was not
able to continue to work and he felt useless and no good. TT 265 (Vol. 2, R. 601).
Prior to the accident, Mr. Harness was physically active. TT 164 (Vol. 1, R. 600). He
jogged approximately five miles each morning and loved to water ski, snow ski, and play
racquetball. TT 164 (Vol. 1, R. 600). He cannot do these activities now. TT 164 (Vol. 1, R.
600); TT 266-69 (Vol. 2, R. 601) (Mrs. Harness describing Mr. Harness' pre- and post-accident
activities). Following the accident, Mr. Harness' gained weight, increasing from around 165
pounds to 210 pounds, and lives with constant pain in his foot. TT 164 (Vol. 1, R. 600). Mr.
7

Harness now walks only with the assistance of a cane or crutches. TT 165-66 (Vol. 1, R. 600);
TT 265-69 (Vol. 2, R. 601).
Mr. Harness' treating physician, orthopedic surgeon Douglas Schow, testified at length
about the traumatic and permanently disabling injuries Mr. Harness suffered as a result of the
accident. TT 126-160 (Vol. 2, R. 601). Dr. Schow explained that Mr. Harness suffered a "burst
type fracture of the calcaneous," TT 128 (Vol. 2, R. 601), which is the large bone in the heel. Id.
at TT 129. According to Dr. Schow, the impact of the fall forced Mr. Harness' heel bone into
and through his ankle bone, shattering his heel into many pieces. Id. at 128-30.
Mr. Harness was immediately admitted to the hospital following the accident. After
waiting several days for the swelling to reduce for purposes of assessing Mr. Harness' condition,
Dr. Schow performed the complicated surgery on Mr. Harness with the help of another
orthopedic surgeon. Id. at 130-34. In doing so, Dr. Schow used a series of staples and drilled a
pin into the bones of Mr. Harness' foot in an attempt to piece the bones in the foot back together.
Id. Dr. Schow told Mrs. Harness that Mr. Harness's injury was one of the worst of that type he
had ever seen and, while doing the best he could, he could not fully repair the damage. TT 160,
264 (Vol. 2,R. 601).4
Dr. Schow continued to treat Mr. Harness' injuries during the extended period between
the accident and the trial. Dr. Schow's uncontradicted testimony demonstrates the absurdity of

4

In footnote 3 of its brief, Smith's references a hip replacement surgery that Mr. Harness
allegedly underwent in 1995. The trial record is completely devoid of any such reference, and
Smith's claim that Mr. Harness underwent a hip replacement surgery that was "admittedly
unconnected to the incident at Smith's" is untrue.
8

Smith's suggestion that Mr. Harness' injuries were not permanently debilitating. Dr. Schow's
testimony also refutes Smith's baseless suggestion that Mr. Harness was lazy or unwilling to try
to work following the accident. In fact, Dr. Schow told Mr. Harness his injuries were being
aggravated by his attempts to return to work and recommended medical retirement for Mr.
Harness. TT 137 (Vol. 2, R. 601).
In April, 1994, Dr. Schow suggested that Mr. Harness' severe continuing pain might be
lessened by a surgical procedure known as triple arthrodesis. TT 140-43 (Vol. 2, R. 601).
Smith's makes the rather disingenuous and entirely baseless assertion in its brief that Mr.
Harness had "recovered so nicely from his injury that he refused" this surgery. See Smith's Brief
at p.iS. in fact, Mr. Harness' decision to forego this procedure to date is completely reasonable
and understandable when Dr. Schow's testimony is considered. Triple arthrodesis involves
opening the joints in the foot and removing all connecting cartilage, thereby locking the foot into
place. By eliminating the foot's ability to move, pain typically is reduced, although there are no
guarantees. In addition to the complete loss of motion, there also are a number of serious
potential negative side affects from the surgery. TT 140-43 (Vol. 2, R. 601).
In October of 1995 (six years after the accident), Dr. Schow consulted with Mr. Harness
about the severe pain he continued to suffer as a result of the accident. Id. at TT 144-46. Dr.
Schow inserted pain killers into the foot and recommended yet another surgical procedure to
remove certain bones from Mr. Harness' foot. Dr. Schow performed this surgery on Mr. Harness
in December of 1996. Id. at 144-48. At trial, Dr. Schow testified that Mr. Harness may desire to

9

undergo yet another surgical procedure (the triple arthrodesis) in the future in an attempt to
reduce Mr. Harness' continuing pain. Id. at TT 149.
As a result of the injuries he sustained in the accident, Mr. Harness, having reached
maximum improvement, was unable to return to his long time occupation. Mr. Harness now "is
significantly limited for standing, walking, climbing and carrying type activities." TT 138-39
(Vol. 2, R. 601) (Dr. Schow testifying).5
Smith's asserts Dr. Schow released Harness to return to work in some new profession.
This assertion is incorrect. Dr. Schow simply stated that the only work Mr. Harness physically
could do was desk-type work. Dr. Schow's recommendation was that Mr. Harness retire. TT 137
(Vol. 2, R. 601). Dr. Schow did not testify that there were jobs available for someone in the
position of Mr. Harness, as Smith's suggests. Dr. Schow in fact testified that he was not aware
of what jobs (if any) might be available for a fifty-five year old man with no college education
who had worked on his feet his entire life and who is disabled and has to walk with a cane. TT
159-60 (Vol. 2, R. 601). He further testified that Mr. Harness had never said or done anything to
suggest he was lazy or did not want to recover from his injuries TT 159 (Vol. 2, R. 601). To the
contrary, Mr. Harness made every effort to maximize his recovery, TT 159 (Vol. 2, R. 601).

5

Smith's attempts to suggest in footnote 4 on page 10 of its Brief that the evidence at trial was
"mixed" as to whether Mr. Harness's injuries to his left foot were permanent. Smith's cites no
record evidence to support its assertion, and the evidence at trial was clear that Mr. Harness had
reached maximum medical improvement long before trial. See, e.g., TT 138-139, 160 (Vol. 2, R.
601) (Dr. Schow testifying); see also Smith's Brief at p. 18 (acknowledging Mr. Harness could
not return to his job with Nabisco).

10

The Social Security Administration found that Mr. Harness is totally and permanently
disabled from the work force. Because Smith's agreed before trial that social security benefits
are collateral source benefits, and because Smith's offered no evidence at trial concerning Mr.
Harness' alleged failure to mitigate his damages, evidence of the Social Security
Administration's findings were notadmitted at trial.
Mr. Harness had worked for Nabisco for twenty years before the accident. TT 52 (Vol. 3,
R. 602). Mr. Harness testified at length concerning his earnings at Nabisco and his annual raises
as well as his considerable benefits. TT 52-77 (Vol. 3, R. 602). Exhibits reflecting Mr. Harness'
benefits, income, tax returns, and other economic information were introduced into evidence
without objection. See TT 52-67 (Vol. 3, R. 602); R. 431 (clerk's list and description of exhibits
offered and received into evidence). Mr. Harness also offered testimony concerning household
services and about how his ability to help with household chores substantially diminished after
the accident. TT 68-71 (Vol. 3, R. 602). Mr. Harness further testified that, prior to trial, he had
met with Michael Davis, a certified public accountant, and provided him with extensive
information and documentation concerning his wages, benefits, and household services
information. Id.
Michael Davis ("Davis"), a certified public accountant, testified as an expert on the
subject of economic damages evaluation, which included Mr. Harness' past and future economic
damages as of the date of trial. Mr. Davis was qualified as an expert on this subject without
objection by Smith's. TT 10-11 (Vol. 3, R. 602). Mr. Davis testified about the extensive work
he had done in connection with calculating Mr. Harness' economic damages and opined that Mr.
11

Harness had suffered economic losses in excess of $680,000. TT 11-12; 37 (Vol. 3, R. 602); see
id. at 13-51, 87-111 (Davis testifying about the work he did and the bases for his calculations and
opinions).
Davis testified, given Mr. Harness' age, lack of college education, lack of marketable job
skills, and disability, it was reasonable and proper to conclude that Mr. Harness could not return
to work in a different profession. TT 91-97, 103-04, 111-12 (Vol. 3, R. 602).
At the trial, Smith's attempted to suggest, through cross-examination of Mr. Davis, that
when companies undergo a reorganization, they often lay off older people in favor of keeping
younger people (suggesting that Mr. Harness would have been laid off because of his age). Mr.
Davis testified that he understood (as, undoubtedly, did everyone in the court room) that it is
illegal for companies to discriminate on the basis of age. The only response from Smith's
counsel was to ask Mr. Davis if he is a lawyer. See TR 111-12 (Vol. 3, R. 602). There was no
evidence introduced at trial that Mr. Harness may or would have been laid off.
Smith's now claims that the jury's damage verdict is not supported by the evidence. See
Smith's Brief at p. 9. Smith's claims that "Plaintiff failed to prove his case because, although he
provided some evidence of his annual income before the injury, he did not show the value of his
time after the injury." Smith's Brief at p. 20. Smith's argues that Mr. Harness should have
returned to work after the accident in some different profession, but he failed to do so. Id.
Smith's simply disregards the abundance of evidence at trial to the contrary, including
substantial testimony and evidence from Mr. and Mrs. Harness, Dr. Schow, and Mr. Davis.
Smith's actual argument is that Mr. Harness purportedly failed to mitigate his damages. Not
12

only is this argument belied by the evidence at trial, Smith's called no witnesses and introduced
no evidence whatsoever at trial to support its claim of failure to mitigate. See Trial Transcript.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Despite Smith's attempts to paint a different picture, the jury returned a fair verdict
supported by adequate evidence. Neither passion nor prejudice played any part in the result. The
trial court properly exercised its considerable discretion when it denied Smith's post judgment
motions. This Court should affirm the jury's damage verdict and the decision of the trial court
denying Smith's post-judgment motions.
A. Preliminary Statement. Smith's seeks reversal of the trial court's ruling denying
JNOV, a new trial, and remittitur It is in the context of these decisions that a trial court is
afforded the greatest discretion. Judge Stirba properly exercised her discretion and denied
Smith's post-judgment motions. Moreover, Smith's waived its right to now seek JNOV because
it did not make the argument concerning damages it now makes when it moved for a directed
verdict. Smith's JNOV, new trial, and remittitur arguments fail because Smith's did not
discharge its duty to marshal the evidence. Moreover, even if it had, its arguments are without
merit. Finally, Smith's bore the burden of proof at trial with respect to its claim that Mr. Harness
failed to adequately mitigate his damages. Mr. Harness introduced substantial evidence
supporting the jury's award of damages. Smith's introduced no evidence of any failure by Mr.
Harness to properly mitigate his damages.
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B. Adequacy of Evidence to Support Damage Award. Judge Stirba correctly
determined that there was a reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury's damage award.
Smith's offered no evidence at trial to counter Mr. Harness' evidence regarding damages.
C. Passion or Prejudice. The trial record is devoid of evidence of passion or prejudice.
The jury's unanimous verdict was based on an abundance of evidence.
ARGUMENT
The thrust of Smith's argument on appeal is that Mr. Harness failed to make reasonable
efforts to mitigate his damages. The trial addressed and correctly rejected the identical
arguments that Smith's now makes to this Court. As discussed in detail below, and as Smith's
acknowledges, in determining whether to grant or deny JNOV, a new trial, or remittitur, a trial
court is accorded the broadest discretion available under Utah law, and the trial court's decision
will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Judge Stirba properly
exercised her discretion in denying Smith's post-trial motions.
"Jury verdicts are entitled to great deference." Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 148
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). In Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d
1325 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows concerning jury verdicts:
We frequently declare our commitment to the jury system, under which it is the
prerogative of lay citizens to determine questions of fact, both as to liability and
the fixing of damages. . . . The court should give the jury system more than lip
service, by honoring the jury's prerogatives; and by declining to interfere
therewith unless the determinations made are entirely without foundation in
evidence, or are so fragmentary and unsubstantial that no reasonable mind acting
fairly on the evidence could have so concluded.
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Id. at 1329. See Mel Hardman Productions. Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah
1979) ("As we have numerous times indicated, the right of trial by jury is one which
should be carefully safeguarded by the courts, and when a party has demanded such a
trial, he is entitled to have the benefit of the jury's findings on issues of fact; and it is not
the trial court's prerogative to disregard or nullify them by making findings of his own.")
In this case, Smith's asks the Court to ignore four days of trial testimony, disregard the
unanimous verdict of the jury, interfere with the jury's prerogative, and reverse the trial court by
entering JNOV. Alternatively, Smith's requests that this Court start the process all over as to
damages by vacating the jury's verdict and setting aside the trial court's ruling on the issue of
damages and ordering a new trial or granting a remittitur. Contrary to Smith's argument, the jury
in this case properly performed its function. It listened to the evidence, weighed the credibility
of the witnesses, and made a reasoned decision based on the evidence presented. The trial court,
who presided over the trial and heard the evidence, properly exercised its discretion in denying
Smith's post-judgment motions.
In support of its motion seeking JNOV or a new trial or remittitur, Smith's makes a
closing argument. It does not marshal the evidence, nor does it characterize the evidence in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw inferences in Mr. Harness' favor, as it
must.

Rather, Smith's asks the Court to draw all inferences in its favor; it ignores the

considerable evidence that supports the jury's verdict; and it inaccurately characterizes trial
evidence in a most self-serving fashion.
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The sole basis for each of Smith's motions is the claim that the jury awarded excessive
damages to Mr. Harness. The heart of Smith's argument is that, following the accident, Mr.
Harness failed to mitigate his damages, and that the jury failed to recognize that purported
failure. Smith's ignores that it, not Mr. Harness, bore the burden at trial of attempting to prove
an alleged failure to mitigate damages.

Smith's also ignores that Mr. Harness introduced

substantial evidence of damages at trial, including substantial evidence as to why he did not enter
into a new profession following the accident and his failed attempt to return to Nabisco.
Smith's, on the other hand, introduced no evidence at trial that Mr. Harness should have
been able to mitigate his damages but failed to do so. Smith's could have called its own damage
expert; it didn't.

Smith's could have called a vocational rehabilitation specialist; it didn't.

Instead, Smith's simply argued to the jury, without any evidence whatsoever to support the
argument, that Mr. Harness failed to mitigate his damages. Mr. Harness argued to the jury that
he did not fail to mitigate his damages. The jury listened to the arguments, considered the
evidence, and made its decision based on the evidence. There is no basis for disturbing the jury's
well-founded decision and the trial court's ruling denying Smith's post-judgment motions.
I.

THE JURY'S VERDICT REGARDING LIABILITY, ALTHOUGH NOT
CHALLENGED ON APPEAL, WAS SUPPORTED BY A WEALTH OF
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL.

Smith's post judgment motions, which challenged only the jury's damage verdict and not
the jury's assessment of liability, see R. 495-512 (memorandum in support of Smith's postjudgment motions), were untimely. The Utah Supreme Court, by Order dated October 26, 1998
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(R. 598) (Exhibit "B"), directed Smith's "to limit its issues on appeal to those concerning the
denial of its post judgment motions." Those issues relate only to damages. There are no
appellate issues concerning liability.
Although liability is not at issue, Smith's attempts to suggest in its Brief that it did
nothing wrong and that the jury's verdict was not based on evidence presented at trial but rather
on passion and prejudice. See, e.g.. Smith's Brief at p. 8,1fl[14, 15; p. 9. This assertion is made
in complete disregard to the evidence presented at trial. An abundance of evidence, including
testimony from several of Smith's own witnesses, see, e.g., TT 35-44 (Vol. 2, R. 601) (testimony
of Smith's current corporate safety director); TT 236-242 (Vol. 2, R. 601) (testimony of Smith's
corporate safety director at the time of the accident); and non-party witnesses, see, ej*., TT 162182 (Vol. 2, R. 601), support the jury's unanimous verdict as to liability. Because liability is not
an issue, Mr. Harness does not address liability issues in this Brief.
II.

SMITH'S IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
JURY'S DAMAGE VERDICT.

A.

This Court Need Not Address the "Merits" of Smith's JNOV Argument
Because Smith's Waived the Argument by Not Raising It in Support of Its
Directed Verdict Motion.

A motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict "is technically only a renewal of the
motion for directed verdict made at the close of the evidence, it cannot assert a ground that was
not included in the motion for directed verdict." 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil Sec. 2537. p. 598 (1971). Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), which governs
motions for directed verdicts and for judgments notwithstanding the verdict, states that "a party
17

who has moved for a directed verdict may move [for judgment notwithstanding the verdict] in
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict." (emphasis added).
Courts that have addressed this issue have repeatedly and consistently held that a motion
requesting JNOV cannot properly be granted on a ground not raised in support of a motion for a
directed verdict. See, e.g., Chavez v. Tolleson Elementary School Dist., 592 P.2d 1017 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1979) (judgment n.o.v. could not be granted on ground not raised in motion for directed
verdict); Security Pacific Housing Services, Inc. v. Friddle, 866 S.W.2d 375 (Ark. 1993) (same);
Thomas v. Holt, 471 S.E.2d 300 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (same); Stewart v. Brennan, 748 P.2d 816
(Haw. Ct. App. 1988) (same).6
In this case, the sole argument Smith's made to the trial court (and now makes on appeal)
in support of JNOV is that the jury's damage award was not supported by evidence. See Smith's
Brief. In moving for a directed verdict at the close of Mr. Harness' case-in-chief, however,
Smith's said nothing about damages. Rather, Smith's argument in favor of its motion for a
directed verdict was based solely on Smith's contention regarding liability. See TT 114-15 (Vol.
3, R. 602) (Smith's counsel arguing that Mr. Harness knew what the hazards were and that Mr.
Harness assumed the risk.) Liability is not an issue on appeal. See R. 598 (Utah Supreme Court

6

See also, e.g., Bonofiglio v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 576 N.E.2d 680 (Mass. 1991) (no
grounds for motion for judgment n.o.v. may be raised which were not asserted in support of
directed verdict motion); Biazrro v. Ziegler, 627 N.E.2d 122 (111. Ct App. 1993) (same); Titan
Constr. Co. v. Mark Twain Kansas City Bank, 887 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (same);
Delmar Crawford, Inc. v. Russell Oil Co., 808 P.2d 1021 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (trial court would
not have authority to enter judgment n.o.v. on basis not raised by directed verdict motion);
Munie v. Tangle Oaks Corp., 427 S.E.2d 149 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (same).
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Order dated October 26, 1998, attached hereto as Exhibit "B" (ordering that Smith's must "limit
its issues on appeal to those concerning the denial of its post judgment motions." Smith's post
judgment motions are limited solely to issues concerning damages.)).
Because Smith's made no argument regarding damages when it moved for a directed
verdict, it cannot properly make that argument in support of its JNOV motion. For this reason
alone, this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of Smith's JNOV motion.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Denied Smith's Motion for JNOV.

Even if Smith's had raised the argument it now makes in seeking JNOV when it moved
for a directed verdict, the argument is without merit. A party is not entitled to a JNOV unless,
viewing all of the evidence and indulging all inferences in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, there is no evidence to support the jury's determination.

See, e.g.. Gold

Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah 1996) ("A j.n.o.v. can be granted
only when the losing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.") "In determining whether
competent evidence supports the verdict, we accept as true all testimony and reasonable
inferences flowing therefrom that tend to prove [the nonmoving party's] case, and we disregard
all conflicts and evidence that tend to disprove its case." Id.; see also Turner v. General
Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises,
879 P.2d 1253, 1359 (Utah 1994).7 "A motion [for j.n.o.v.] should be denied if reasonable

7

The standard is the same for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as it is for directed verdict.
See, e.g., Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 838-39 (Utah 1992).
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persons could reach differing conclusions on the issue in controversy." Id.; McCloud v. Baum,
569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977).
In determining a motion for JNOV, the Court does not weigh the evidence. The weight
of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are within the jury's sole province. E.g.,
Winters v. W.S. Hatch Company, 546 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1976).
In support of its argument that the Court should overturn the trial court's ruling denying
JNOV, Smith's does not claim Mr. Harness was not injured and does not claim he could return to
work at his old job - indeed, Smith's acknowledges Mr. Harness could not return to work for
Nabisco. See Smith's Brief at p. 18.8 Smith's also acknowledges that Mr. Harness physically
could not do the type of work he had done his entire life. Id. Instead, Smith's simply asserts Mr.
Harness failed to mitigate his damages and asks this Court, as a matter of law, to find that
Smith's sustained its burden of demonstrating that Mr. Harness failed to reasonably mitigate his
damages.9
Although alleging Mr. Harness failed to mitigate his damages, Smith's cites no evidence
as to the amount, if any, it claims Mr. Harness purportedly could have earned or how he could or
should have earned it, given his age, lack of training, lack of education, and lack of experience
other than in the grocery business. Smith's introduced no evidence at trial that Mr. Harness

8

This admission is at odds with Smith's claim that Mr. Harness recovered nicely from his injury,
Smith's Brief at p. 18, and its unfounded assertion that the evidence regarding the "permanent
nature" of Mr. Harness' injury "was mixed at best." Smith's Brief at p. 10, n.4.
9

Even were Smith's right, which it is not, its argument at most supports a claim for remittitur,
not for JNOV.
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could have worked at any job given the many obstacles he faced or that he in any way failed to
reasonably attempt to mitigate his damages. To the contrary, all Smith's did at trial was to have
Mr. Davis, Mr. Harness' damages expert, perform a calculation of how much Mr. Harness would
have earned, ^assuming he could have secured a minimum wage job. Such an exercise obviously
did not constitute evidence that Mr. Harness could have obtained such a job or that he failed to
reasonably attempt to mitigate his damages.
As previously noted, the Social Security Administration determined that Mr. Harness is
permanently and totally disabled from the work force. Had Smith's sought to introduce evidence
at trial in an attempt to support its claim of failure to mitigate, Harness could have introduced the
determination by the Social Security Administration concerning Mr. Harness. There was no
need to introduce this additional evidence, however, because Smith's made no attempt to
introduce evidence of any failure to mitigate.
Dr. Schow testified that Mr. Harness could not return to his work at Nabisco, and that the
only work he physically could do was a desk job. TT 162 (Vol. 1, R. 600); TR 138-39 (Vol. 2,
R. 601). Dr. Schow did not testify that Mr. Harness could or should obtain employment - only
that a desk job was the only type of work he physically could do. TT 159-60 (Vol. 2, R. 601).
As previously noted, Dr. Schow recommended medical retirement for Mr. Harness. TT 137 (Vol.
2,R. 601).
Mr. Harness testified about why he did not return to work after he attempted
unsuccessfully to return to his work at Nabisco.
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Mrs. Harness also testified about their

discussions and efforts relating to Mr. Harness returning to work and their conclusions and
reasons why Mr. Harness could no longer work. Both testified about the -devastation the family
experienced when they concluded that Mr. Harness could not return to work. Mr. Davis, Mr.
Harness' damages expert, also testified in considerable detail why it was reasonable to conclude
that Mr. Harness could not return tor work.
On the other hand, no one testified that Mr. Harness could or should have obtained some
kind of employment to mitigate his damages. No one testified or offered an opinion favorable to
Smith's as to how long it would have taken Mr. Harness to be trained in some kind of new
occupation, or even whether he could be trained.

No one testified regarding whether Mr.

Harness could have returned to work at all, and, even if he could, how long it would have taken
Mr. Harness to find a job, how much or how little he likely would have earned, or how much it
would have cost to retrain Mr. Harness in a new job, assuming some type of retraining made any
sense at all.
Smith's states that Mr. Harness' supervisor at Nabisco, James Black, testified that
"organizational changes" at Nabisco had resulted in the termination of all of Mr. Harness' coworkers. See Smith's Brief at p. 13; see id. at p. 7 (paragraph 11). Smith's claims this makes the
jury's award for lost future wages speculative. This claim is without merit. Mr. Black testified
only that a lot of the individuals that he and Mr. Harness had worked with at Nabisco were now
gone. TT 226-27 (Vol. 2, R. 601). He further testified:
Q
As you sit here today do you have any reason that Mr. Harness
would have been fired or let go, but for the accident, from Nabisco?
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A

I don't believe so, but, again, I don't know.

TT 229 (Vol. 2, R. 601). Black added that "it was common for an individual to retire
from Nabisco in their sixties." Id. Ron Morgan, who testified at trial, was a co-worker of
Mr. Harness. TT 136-37 (Vol. 3, R. 602). Contrary to Smith's claim that all of Mr.
Harness' co-workers were terminated in the mid-1990's, Mr. Morgan continued to work
as a sales representative for Nabisco until March of 1996, when he retired. Id.
There is no valid argument that Mr. Harness did not suffer impairment of income and loss
of wages as a result of the accident. Mr. Harness had an excellent job. He was a star performer
for Nabisco. He had worked for Nabisco for over 20 years. Six months before the accident, he
had been awarded Nabisco's most lucrative sales route. Mr. Harness was out of work for months
following the accident, and there is no dispute that he could not return to his career with Nabisco.
As of the date he first lost wages, 1991 (after rehabilitating, then attempting
unsuccessfully to return to work at Nabisco, and then again rehabilitating), Mr. Harness was 55
years old. He has no marketable job skills or experience. He suffers constant pain. Combining
these factors - a permanent, limiting disability, age, lack of education, and lack of marketable
skills — with the evidence presented at trial and the fact that Smith's presented no evidence that
Mr. Harness failed to mitigate his damages — the jury's award of damages was entirely proper, as
was the trial court's denial of Smith's motion requesting JNOV.
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III.

SMITH'S IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL.

Smith's claims that the damages the jury awarded to Mr. Harness for pain and suffering
($200,000, reduced to $160,000 after adjustment for comparative fault) and lost income were
excessive and thus the Court should grant a new trial. Smith's again makes arguments that are
not supported by the evidence and that ignore the actual evidence presented at trial.
Smith's attack on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's damage
determination fails for at least two reasons. First, Smith's wholly failed to properly discharge its
duty to marshal the evidence. This Court, therefore, need not even reach the merits of Smith's
argument for a new trial or remittitur. Second, Smith's arguments are not supported by the
record in this case and are without merit.
A.

This Court Need Not Address Smith's Damage Arguments Because Smith's
Failed in Its Duty to Marshal the Evidence.

Appellate courts in this State unfailingly require parties who attack the decisions of a trial
court or jury based on an alleged insufficiency of evidence to marshal all evidence in support of
the findings and then demonstrate that the marshaled evidence is insufficient. In Mountain States
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court observed:
In order to challenge a trial court's findings of fact, a party "must marshal the
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the
clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.'" In re BartelL
776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Walker, 743
P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). See also, &&, Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,
1970 (Utah 1985); Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). Appellants often overlook or disregard this heavy burden. When the duty
to marshal is not properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of
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challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid."
added.]

[Emphasis

This Court need not consider Smith's argument that the jury's verdict is not supported by
competent evidence because Smith's has failed to marshal all (indeed, any of) the evidence
supporting the verdict and then demonstrate that it is insufficient. See, e^g., Price-Orem Inv. Co.
v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell 713 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1986).
Smith's makes but passing reference to the damage testimony offered at trial and then
self-servingly concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's damage award.
Contrary to its obligations, Smith's ignores the abundant evidence supporting Mr. Davis' damage
analysis. See, e ^ , TT 7-51, 86-113 (Vol. 3, R. 602); it fails to include in its "marshaled"
evidence the testimony of Dr. Schow; it ignores much of the relevant testimony of Mr. and Mrs.
Harness and that of economic expert Michael Davis; and it ignores other evidence introduced at
trial, including testimony and multiple exhibits regarding wages, benefits, annual raises,
longevity with Nabisco, and the like. See TT 52-72 (Vol. 3, R. 602). Smith's also ignores
undisputed evidence of the devastating impact of the accident on Mr. Harness, including his loss
of employment, his constant pain, the undisputed fact that he now must walk with a cane or
crutches and only then short distances, and the undisputed evidence that Mr. Harness no longer
can do many things he enjoyed doing and often did prior to the accident.

Smith's simply

concludes, despite an abundance of contrary evidence, that the jury's award was "grossly
excessive." See Smith's Brief at 19, 20.
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In Crookston v. Fire Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
To demonstrate that evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdict, the one
challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and
then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed n the light most
favorable to the verdict. E.g., Morgan v. Ouailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d
573, 577 n.3 (Utah 1985); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1985). Here, Fire Insurance has made no attempt to marshal the evidence in
support of the jury finding of fraud. In fact, all Fire Insurance has done is argue
selected evidence favorable to its position. That does not begin to meet the
marshaling burden it must carry. We do not sit to retry facts. See Campbelt Int'l
Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987); Von Hake v. Thomas Von
Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). This failure alone is grounds to
reject Fire Insurance's attack on the fraud finding, e,g., Hansen, 761 P.2d at 17;
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987); Hagen v. Hagen, 801 P.2d 478,
483 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 799-800.
Like the party challenging the jury's verdict in Crookston, in this case Smith's has simply
argued selected evidence it attempts to characterize as favorable to its position. Smith's does not
begin to meet the marshaling burden it must carry. Because Smith's failed to properly discharge
its duty to marshal the evidence, this Court should accept the findings of the jury and the
propriety of the trial court's denial of Smith's post-judgment motions and decline to even reach
the merits of Smith's appeal.
B.

The Trial Court's Denial of Smith's Motion for New Trial Was Proper.

Even had Smith's properly marshaled the evidence, that evidence convincingly supports
the jury's verdict and the trial court's denial of Smith's post judgment motions.
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"Motions for new trials are generally not favored in the law, in part because it is costly
and inefficient to hold multiple trials on the same cause of action." Davis v. Grand County
Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817
P.2d 789, 803 (Utah 1991)). The Utah Supreme Court cautioned in Goddard v. Hickman, 685
P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984), that new trials should be granted only in "rare cases." When the
motion for a new trial is based on insufficiency of the evidence, "the trial court may grant a new
trial only if the jury's verdict is so contrary to the manifest weight that the trial judge 'cannot in
good conscience permit it to stand.'" Id. at 532 (citations omitted). "A trial court cannot grant a
new trial if there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict for either party and the judge merely
disagrees with the judgment of the jury." Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789,
799 n.9 (1991).10 Accord Goddard, 684 P.2d at 532 ("Even though a trial judge may disagree
with a verdict, mere disagreement is not sufficient reason to order a new trial.") Moreover,
because "[a] second trial is not without its costs in terms of scarce litigant and judicial resources
and the possible unavailability of witnesses or the erosion of their memories[,] . . . the trial
judge's prerogative to grant a new trial on an evidentiary basis under Rule 59(a)(6) [alleged
insufficiency of evidence to support the verdict] should be exercised with forbearance." Nelson
v. Truiillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982). Accord Goddard, 685 P.2d at 532.

10

The Supreme Court in Crookston noted that a new trial is proper pursuant to rule 59(a)(6) only
if the trial judge "can reasonably conclude that the verdict is clearly against the weight of the
evidence or that there is insufficient evidence to justify the verdict."). Crookston, 817 P.2d at
816 n.9. "If there be an evidentiary basis for the jury's decision, the denial of the new trial must
be affirmed." McCloud, 569 P.2d at 1127.
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Addressing damage awards, which is the sole basis on which Smith's seeks a new trial,
the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
As long as there is some rational basis for the damage award, it is the wrongdoer
who must assume the risk of some uncertainty. Where there is evidence of the
fact of damage, a defendant may not escape liability because the amount of
damage cannot be proven with precision.
Bastian v. King. 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983). In Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808
P.2d 1069, 1079 (Utah 1991), the Court held: "We uphold jury verdicts awarding damages as
long as there is some rational basis for the award." And in Duffy v. Union Pacific RR Co., 218
P.2d 1080 (Utah 1950), the Utah Supreme Court observed:
The verdict here was admittedly liberal. But the mere fact that it was more than
another jury, or more than this Court, might have given, or even more than the
evidence justified, does not conclusively show that it was the result of passion,
prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jury. . . .
Duffy, 218 P.2d at 1080 (cited with approval in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d
789 (Utah 1991)). See also Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1084
(Utah 1985) ("To justify a new trial for excessive damages . . ., the damage award must be more
than generous; it must be clearly excessive on any rational view of the evidence." (citations
omitted)). Finally, in Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court
observed: "Juries are generally allowed wide discretion in the assessment of damages. We view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's findings and will uphold its calculation of
damages so long as there is competent evidence to sustain it." Id. at 1386 (citing cases).
In this case, the jury's verdict was not excessive or even particularly liberal. There is a
rational basis for the jury's damage award, and it should not be disturbed.
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1.

The Jury's Award of Economic Damages Was Not Excessive.

Michael Davis presented expert testimony at trial regarding Mr. Harness' economic
damages. Mr. Davis is a licensed Certified Public Accountant, has extensive experience in
performing damage calculations, has testified in court as a recognized damage expert on many
occasions, and was qualified in this case as a damage expert without objection from Smith's.
During direct examination, Mr. Davis explained in detail the analysis he performed of
Mr. Harness' economic losses to the jury. He presented a detailed chart to the jury setting forth
his calculations.

The jury awarded economic damages in an amount equal to Mr. Davis'

calculations. Smith's does not claim in requesting a new trial that Mr. Davis made improper
calculations or made improper assumptions. Nor did Mr. Davis admit on cross-examination that
his assumptions were mistaken or wrong. In fact, Smith's cross-examination of Mr. Davis
consisted principally of asking Mr. Davis whether, if certain of his assumptions were substituted
with assumptions suggested by Smith's, which assumptions were completely lacking in
supporting evidence, his conclusions regarding the amount of damages would be different.
The fallacy of Smith's argument for a new trial is two-fold. First, as previously discussed
in this Brief, a significant amount of evidence was presented to the jury regarding Mr. Harness'
economic damages. Mr. Davis testified that, in his opinion, it was reasonable to conclude that
Mr. Harness could not return to work after he unsuccessfully attempted to return to work at
Nabisco. He explained several reasons for this conclusion. Mr. Harness testified about his desire
to return to work, his efforts to do so, and the factors that led he and his wife to ultimately
conclude that he could not reasonably return to work. Dr. Schow testified he recommended
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medical retirement for Mr. Harness. The Social Security Administration found Mr. Harness to
be permanently and totally disabled.
Although Smith's designated a damage expert and vocational expert in the lawsuit,
Smith's did not call either of these people to testify at trial.

Now, Smith's attempts to

characterize the facts and make a jury argument (in fact, the same argument it made to the jury)
that Mr. Harness did not reasonably mitigate. Mr. Harness explained to the jury what he did, and
he explained the major obstacles to obtaining alternative employment. The most Smith's could
argue in response is that Mr. Harness perhaps could have obtained a minimum wage job
somewhere. On even this point, however, Smith's presented no supporting evidence.
Second, Smith's, whether mistakenly or intentionally, attempts to shift its burden to Mr.
Harness.

Smith's, not Mr. Harness, bore the burden at trial to establish that Mr. Harness

unreasonably failed to mitigate his damages. See, ej*., Pratt v. Board of Education of Uintah
County School District, 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977) ("[T]he burden is upon the party whose
wrongful act caused the damages to prove anything in diminution thereof." (citing numerous
cases)); John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
("[T]he burden of proving plaintiff has not mitigated its damages and that its award should be
correspondingly reduced is on defendant.").11 Smith's not only failed to carry this burden, it
introduced no evidence whatsoever at trial of any such alleged failure on the part of Mr. Harness

11

Smith's recognized its burden from the outset when, in its Answer and Jury Demand, it pled as
a Sixth Defense as follows: "As an affirmative defense, Smith's alleges that the Plaintiff has
failed to reasonably mitigate his damages, if any." R.15.
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to mitigate his damages. Instead, Smith's simply makes the very same argument it made to the
jury and, in the context of its post trial motions, to the trial court. The jury obviously was not
convinced, nor was the trial court.

Smith's unsupported arguments do not justify interference

with the jury's verdict or the trial court's discretion.
The jury properly exercised its judgment and discretion in awarding damages.

The

verdict was not based on passion or prejudice. Indeed, the jury accepted Mr. Davis' testimony
and calculations regarding economic damages. There obviously was a rational basis on which
the jury could find special damages, and the jury so found.
2.

The Jury's Award of Damages for Pain and Suffering and Loss of
Enjoyment of Life Was Not Excessive.

Smith's presents various arguments (several of which are nothing short of nonsensical),
with respect to its claim that the jury awarded excessive general damages. For example, Smith's
claims that Mr. Harness was released to return to work "within weeks of the accident, provided
he stay off his heel." Smith's Brief at p. 16. The evidence at trial was that Mr. Harness was in a
cast for weeks following the accident, and he was not allowed to even attempt to return to work
for months following the accident.12 When he attempted to go back to work, as Mr. Harness
desperately wanted to do, he experienced practically unbearable pain and swelling in his foot and
ankle and, ultimately, was unable to continue working.

12

Smith's assertion is even contrary to paragraph 5 of its own factual statement, wherein Smith's
acknowledges that Mr. Harness was not released to attempt to return to work until "in or about
April, of 1990," seven months after the September, 1989 accident.
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Smith's argues that the jury's award of general damages was "eighteen (18) times the
amount of special damages, is evidence that the award "was given under the influence of passion
or prejudice . . ." (Smith's Brief at p. 18). Smith's not only misstates the verdict, it cites no case
or other legal authority to support this claim. There is none. Apparently, Smith's believes that if
Mr. Harness' leg had been amputated as a result of the accident, and it had cost $1,000 to
perform the amputation, an award of general damages of $18,000 would be grossly excessive.
Such a position is completely unsupported by fact or law and defies common sense and reason.
The argument also seeks to invade the province of the jury.
The evidence at trial was that Mr. Harness suffers constant pain; that years after the
accident he continued to receive injections of pain killers, that he had a second operation to
remove portions of the bones from his foot, and that even now he faces a possible third surgery
that will lock his foot in place. Yet Smith's claims that Mr. Harness feels so good and has
"recovered so nicely from his injury" that he refused further heel surgery offered by Dr. Schow."
(Smith's Brief, at p. 18). This assertion not only is completely baseless, it borders, and perhaps
crosses, the line of the ridiculous. Dr. Schow explained at trial the nature of the further surgery
to which Smith's refers. The operation would be a fusion of Mr. Harness' left foot, an operation
that would result in Mr. Harness' foot being completely locked in place, leaving Mr. Harness
unable to move his foot at all. Dr. Schow testified that, even with the operation, Mr. Harness
likely would not be relieved of all pain, and he might not be relieved of any of his pain.13 It is

13

Smith's also ignores that such an operation would be very expensive, thereby significantly
reducing its self-created "18 to 1" ratio of general damages to medical expenses.
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entirely understandable and reasonable that Mr. Harness has, to date, chosen to forego such an
operation.
The evidence at trial was that Mr. Harness was physically very active before the accident.
He loved to water ski and snow ski and he jogged almost every day for several years before the
accident. He camped and hiked with his wife, children, and grandchildren. He enjoyed regularly
going on walks with his wife. He engaged in many physical activities, none of which he can now
enjoy. Mr. Harness cannot walk more than a short distance without experiencing intense pain.
He must always use at least a cane to walk, and sometimes crutches. His life as he once knew it
has been taken away. Mr. Harness experiences constant pain. He suffers the psychological
impact of having lost his job. He has lost self esteem and has felt worthless, as evidenced by the
statement to his wife that she would have been better off had he been killed in the accident. Yet,
according to Smith's, $200,000 (reduced to $160,000 based on comparative fault) in general
damages is excessive.
The comments by Smith's own counsel during opening statements are instructive of the
dichotomy between what occurred at trial and the position Smith's takes on appeal: "This isn't
a situation where Smith's is coming in and saying oh we think that this is just a fake. These
injuries are serious and they're painful and we're sympathetic to that." TT 115-16 (Vol. 1,
R. 600) (Opening Statement by Smith's legal counsel (emphasis added)).
Smith's claim that the "jury's verdict, in and of itself, is the best evidence of the fact that
the jury acted from passion and prejudice" (Smith's Brief at p. 19) is instructive. Given the
debilitating and permanent nature of Mr. Harness' injuries, as well as the disruption to his life;
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the loss of enjoyment of life; and the constant pain and suffering he experiences, the jury's
verdict does speak for itself.
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT REMIT THE JURY'S AWARD OF DAMAGES.

Even if Smith's had met its burden of marshaling the evidence, there is no basis for
remitting the jury's award of damages. The jury's damage award, both as to special and general
damages, was well supported by the evidence at trial. The economic damages the jury awarded
Mr. Harness, consisting of medical expenses, lost wages and benefits (past and future), and loss
of household services, were consistent with the evidence presented at trial through Mr. Harness,
his wife, Dr. Schow, and through the damage expert, Mr. Davis. Smith's claim that there was no
evidence to support these damages simply ignores the abundance of evidence that was, in fact,
introduced at trial. And, as repeatedly noted above, Smith's introduced no evidence whatsoever
at trial to rebut Mr. Harness' evidence or to demonstrate any failure by Mr. Harness to
reasonably mitigate his damages.
It is within the exclusive province of the jury to determine the amount of damages a party
has suffered due to the negligence of a defendant. As long as there is some rational basis in the
evidence for the award, which there plainly was in this case, the jury has wide discretion to
determine what damages are appropriate. The jury properly made that determination here. The
trial court properly exercised its broad discretion and upheld the unanimous decision of the jury.
Remittitur is inappropriate under these circumstances.
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CONCLUSION
Smith's made no argument concerning damages when it moved for a directed verdict and
therefore cannot properly raise that argument in support of JNOV.

In connection with its

challenge to the trial court's denial of its post judgment motions, Smith's has completely failed
to discharge its duty to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's damage verdict and the trial
court's denial of Smith's post judgment motions and then demonstrate that the evidence is
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. As the court stated in
Crookston, "that failure alone is grounds to reject [the defendant's] attack on the [jury's]
finding." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 799-800. For these reasons alone, Smith's attack on the trial
court's denial of Smith's motion for jnov, new trial, and/or remittitur should be rejected.
Moreover, the trial court's exercise of its substantial discretion in denying Smith's post
judgment motions should be affirmed on the merits. JNOV, new trial, and remittitur are all
inappropriate in this case based on the evidence introduced at trial that supports the jury's
verdict. Smith's improperly relies on characterizations and arguments it draws from alleged
evidence in arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Smith's post judgment
motions. Smith's ignores and mischaracterizes key evidence; it cites as "evidence" alleged facts
that were not even introduced at trial; it attempts to improperly shift burdens it failed to carry to
Mr. Harness; and it asks the Court to invade the province of the jury and the discretion of the trial
court.
The jury in this case carefully listened to and assessed the evidence and made an
informed, well-reasoned decision. The trial court, having presided over every aspect of the trial;
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having observed the witnesses; and having listened to all of the evidence, properly exercised its
considerable latitude of discretion and denied Smith's post judgment motions, thereby affirming
the jury's unanimous verdict. This Court should affirm the trial court's rulings denying Smith's
post judgment motions.
DATED this \<\\^day of March, 1999.
JOHNSON & HATCH
Mark F. James
Paul C. Drecksel

By: 1Y\JL

J.QA^V&J

Attorneys for Plaintiff David W. Mr. Harness
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two tme and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE DAVID HARNESS to be hand-delivered this ^ W day of March, 1998, to the
following:
Randall D. Lund
Clayne I. Corey
948 East 7145 South, Suite C-103
Salt Lake City, Utah 84047
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505 East 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102-2007
Telephone: (801)322-1113
Facsimile: (801)531-7271
Attorneys for Defendant Smith's
Food & Drug Centers. Inc.

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

DAVID W. HARNESS
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS* MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT AND MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL, OR MOTION FOR
REMITTITUR

vs.
SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTER'S
INC,
Civil No: 950900409 PI
Defendant.
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Defendant Smith's Food & Dmg Centers Inc. ("Smith's"), by and through its counsel of
record, Randall D. Lund, hereby submits this memorandum in support of its Motion for
Judgement Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the alternative, a New Trial or, in the alternative,
for Remittitur.

FACTS
1.

During the course of trial in the above-captioned case, Plaintiff claimed to have

sustained more than $680,000 in lost income due to the injuries he suffered in the 1989 accident
which occurred in the back room of Smith's Kearns, Utah, store (the "Store").
2.

Plaintiffs treating physician, Dr. Douglas Schow, released Plaintiff for work in or

about April of 1990. By way of stipulation, the parties agreed that Plaintiffs reasonable and
necessary medical bills were approximately Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000).
3.

With the exception of one six (6) month period in 1990, Plaintiff has made no

effort since the date of the accident to return to work - any kind of work. Pursuant thereto,
Plaintiff not only admitted on cross-examination that he had not seriously considered other
career possibilities, but he acknowledged that with the exception of "calling a few community
schools years ago" he had given no consideration to retraining himself or pursing some form of
education or career training in another area that would not have required that he be on his feet.
4.

The undisputed evidence was that the only injury Plaintiff suffered in connection

with the subject incident was a broken heel. Plaintiff admitted that he had no limitations with
respect to any other part of his physical and/or mental being, to wit: Plaintiff sustained no brain
or head injur}', no neck or back injuries or any other kind of injury to any other part of his body
that would preclude him from updating his education and/or pursuing other career alternatives
that did not require he be on his feet as was required in his job with Nabisco.
5.

Plaintiffs lost income claim of Six Hundred Eighty Thousand Dollars ($680,000)

was based on the following assumptions: (1) that Plaintiff was totally disabled and completely

3

unable to return to any kind of work; (2) that Plaintiffs level of income at the time of the injury
would have grown steadily from the date of the injury in September of 1989 until he retired
sixteen years later, in the year 2005; (3) that Plaintiff would have continued his employment
with Nabisco throughout the date of injury to his projected date of retirement.
6.

Contrary to the assumptions underlying Plaintiffs lost income claim, the evidence

at trial was that Plaintiffs future with Nabisco was highly speculative. First, Plaintiffs
supervisor at the time of the subject incident, James Black, testified that Mr. Harness was not
being considered for any type of advancement - that "he had gone as far as he could;" and
second, Mr. Black testified that neither he, or any of the people Plaintiff worked with at
Nabisco's, were there any longer because they had been ''organized out" by Nabisco's several
years prior thereto.
7.

With respect to his departure from Nabisco, Mr. Black testified that he possessed

the same basic job qualifications as Plaintiff (e.g., high school education and years of
employment in the grocery industry) and that when he left Nabisco it took him a w'few months"
to start a new career and, pursuant thereto, generate personal income. Conversely, Mr. Harness
has had nine years to develop a new career and entirely failed to do so.
8.

Aside from calling a few schools about possible avenues of training and

considering some job opportunities 'like real estate" shortly after the subject incident occurred,
Mr. Harness was not able to identify any concrete steps he had taken to mitigate his damages
and/or otherwise re-train himself for employment and/or pursue any kind of alternative
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educational and/or career possibility. Conversely, Mr. Harness frankly admitted that he sat at
home while his wife supported his family through her job as a secretary.
9.

Plaintiffs economist testified that during the past five (5) to ten (10) years, Utah's

economy has been i%booming" and that the unemployment rate in Salt Lake County and Utah
County was the lowest it has been in more than twenty (20) years. Pursuant thereto, Plaintiffs
economist testified that not only is it his understanding that there are many employers searching
for reliable employees with the potential qualifications Plaintiff claimed made him such a
valuable employee to Nabisco's, but he admitted that it was his understand that it was an
"employees market" and that employees were able to pick and choose among various job
opportunities.
10.

Plaintiff testified that, at the time of the subject incident, he was an employee of

Nabisco's Inc. and, pursuant thereto, Nabisco's was responsible for training him in the manner
in which he performed his job. Conversely, Plaintiff admitted that Smith's had no duty to train
and/or supervise him in the performance of his professional responsibilities and that all of his
training had been provided to him by Nabisco's
11.

With respect to the actual performance of his job and the shelves in question,

Plaintiff testified that he only used Smith's ladder about 50% of the time and that, in any event,
he fell from a position on the shelves where he always stood, regardless of whether he used the
ladder or not.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
SMITH'S IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT ON
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR LOST EARNING CAPACITY
Defendant Smith's is entitled to a J.N.O.V. on Plaintiffs claim for lost income in
this case because there is no competent-evidence to support the jury's verdict on the issue of lost
income and/or loss of earning capacity. Conversely, the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated
that Plaintiffs lost income claim was nothing more than unsupported speculation.
Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah rules of Civil Procedure the Utah Supreme Court has
recognized that a trial court has a duty to correct a verdict if there is no competent evidence to
support the verdict or if the verdict was influenced by passion or prejudice. For example, in
King v. Feredav, 739 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1987) the Court stated:
A trial court should grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict if, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, it finds that no
competent evidence supports the verdict."
Id. at 620. See. See also Scott v. Nabours. 296 N.E.2d 438 (Ind. App. 1973) (upholding
directed verdict on claim for lost "earning capacity" where plaintiffs evidence was not such as
to permit the jury to draw any reasonable inference on impairment of earning capacity).

Lost income and/or earning capacity, for which the jury awarded plaintiff nearly
$680,000.00 in this case, is defined as the "permanent diminution in the ability to earn money."
See 22 Am Jur 2d Damages § 157 (emphasis added). See also Scott v. Nabours, 296 N.E.2d
438 (Ind. App. 1973) ("The basic measure of damages for impairment of earning capacity is the
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difference between the amount which plaintiff was capable of earning before the injury and the
amount which he was capable of earning thereafter.") (emphasis added).
To prove a loss of earning capacity, plaintiff was required to prove his personal earning
capacity before the injury, and that the personal capacity was diminished after the injury:
Diminution or impairment of earning capacity is generally to be arrived at by
comparing what the injured party was capable of earning at or before the time of
the injury with what he was capable of earning after it occurred.
See, e.g., 22 Am Jur 2d Damages § 167, and cases cited therein (emphasis added). See also
Restatement rZnd'l of Torts § 924. comment d:
The extent of future harm to the earning capacity of the injured person is measured
bv the difference, viewed as of the time of trial, between the value of plaintiff s
services as they will be in view of the harm and as they would have been had there
been no harm.
The fact of lost earning capacity "cannot be found from speculation and conjecture, but
there must be a sound basis in evidence from which it can reasonably be determined that there is
a greater probability [that the fact is as claimed by plaintiff] than otherwise." See Koer v.
Mavfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah 1967). In Allen Distributing Co. v. Leatherwood,
648 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. App. 1983), the court noted:
Where a plaintiff seeks special damages for loss of earning capacity in a particular
business or profession, the amount of his earnings or the value of his services must
be shown with reasonable certainty.
See 648 S.W.2d at 774. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 312 comment d ("As a
condition to recover . . . for harm to earning capacity the person harmed must offer evidence,
convincing to the trier of fact . . . that his earning capacity has been significantly harmed.").

HARNESS-MEM-NEWTRIAL. 02 . wpd
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Viewed in light of the above, Plaintiffs evidence fails to prove either the fact of lost
income and/or personal earning capacity, or any reasonably certain value of lost income and/or
personal earning power. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim fails for three reasons:
1.

Plaintiff Not Totally Disabled - He Suffered A Broken Heel: Plaintiff

sustained a broken and, admittedly, painful heel. However, no other part of his person was
injured and he certainly was not 100% disabled or anything close to totally disabled. So long as
the Plaintiff was not required to be on his feet for extended periods of time, he was cleared to
work by his doctors within weeks of the subject accident;
2.

Assumption of Continuous Employment Unsupported Speculation: A key

assumption underlying Plaintiffs lost income claim is the notion that Plaintiff would have
enjoyed an uninterrupted stream of income from continuous employment with Nabisco's until
his date of retirement in the year 2004. However, this assumption proved to be nothing more
than unsubstantiated speculation. Plaintiffs former supervisor at Nabisco. Jim Black, testified
that "organizational changes" at Nabisco resulted in the termination and/or departure of not only
all of Plaintiff s former co-workers at Nabisco's (e.g., the other vendors), but also the people
who were his immediate supervisors (e.g., Jim Black); and
3.

Plaintiff Made Decision Not to Work: Plaintiff s failure to secure new

employment during the nine (9) year period of time between the date of his injury and the date
of trial was a result of his own personal decision to not pursue other employment and/or
educational opportunities that might have led to retraining and/or employment. As indicated
above, Plaintiff was not 100% totally disabled and, given the "booming Utah economy," he

HARNESS -MEM-NEWTRIAL. 02 . w p d
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could have easily found employment in any number of possible areas. Instead, he choose not to
work. There was absolutely no evidence introduced at trial which could support the jury's
conclusion that Plaintiff was 100% disabled and/or totally unable to work.
Although the Plaintiffs injury limited his ability to perform certain kinds of labor, the
fact that he is capable of engaging in other kinds of work demands that his capability for work
be factored into his lost income claim. For example, in Scott v. Nabours, 296 N.E.2d 438 (Ind.
App. 1973), plaintiff worked as a laborer for approximately $3.42 an hour. He then suffered an
injury consisting of "severe whiplash," " kyphosis," "nerve pressure," etc., all of which a doctor
opined were permanent and which interfered with the plaintiffs ability to do certain climbing
and lifting required by his job. At the time of trial, plaintiff was making approximately $3.88 an
hour doing perhaps a slightly different job. On appeal from the trial court's directed verdict on
the claim for lost "earning capacity," the court stated:
'.. . [Djamages for impairment of earning capacity cannot be recovered in a
personal injury action where there is no evidence of such impairment or no
evidence from which damages therefor can be calculated. Although the evidence
need not show conclusively or with absolute certainty that earning capacity has
been impaired, mere conjecture or speculation does not warrant an award of
damages therefor in personal injury actions. . . . Accordingly, most courts hold that
in order to warrant a recovery for impairment of earning capacity in personal injury
actions, the impairment of earning capacity must be shown with reasonable
certainty or reasonable probability, and there must be evidence which will permit
the jury to arrive at a pecuniary value of the loss.'

In this case the Appellant's evidence did not make the necessary final step
to relate the Appellant's condition to an impaired vocational potential. The
Appellant's evidence would not permit the jury to draw such inferences on that
subject. Therefore, it was permissible for the trial court to withdraw that issue
from the jury.
HARNESS-MEM-NEWTRIAL.02.wpd
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See 296 N.E.2d at 441 (citations omitted).
In this case Plaintiffs only evidence of lost income and/or loss of earning capacity was
the present value calculation provided his economist based on his annual income before the
accident and the assumption that, except for the incident at Smith's, he would have worked
continuously during the fifteen (15) year period of time between his accident and his projected
retirement date. Plaintiff made no effort to prove precisely how this injury actually effected his
actual or potential ability to retrain himself and/or seek alternative forms of employment.
Under the circumstances, and as a matter of law, Plaintiff failed to prove the necessary
final step for a claim that his capability to earn money had been substantially diminished, let
alone diminished in the amount of $680,000, the present value of his annual income as projected
over the 15 year period of time between the date of the accident and his projected retirement.
Smith's is therefore entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the award of lost
personal earning capacity.
POINT II
SMITH'S IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO
RULE 59 BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court should grant Smith's
motion for a new trial in the above-captioned matter because the damages awarded by the jury
are excessive and were awarded under the influence of passion or prejudice. Rule 59 provides
that a trial court may award a new trial for the following reasons:
(a)

Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all
or any of the parties on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes:

HARNESS-MEM-NEWTRIAL.02.wpd
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(5)

excessive . . . damages, appearing to have been given under the influence
of passion or prejudice.

(6)

insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that
it against law.

Ut.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(5)(6)(7).

The trial court's discretion to grant a new trial pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 59 because of
evidentiary insufficiency or legal error is well-established. "The trial judge has broad latitude in
granting or denving a motion for new trial, and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse
of discretion." See Nelson v. Truiillo. 657 P.2d 730, 731 (Utah 1982). "[A] trial judge may
properly grant a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) when he or she can reasonably conclude that the
verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence or that there is insufficient evidence to
justify the verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 799 n.9 (Utah 1991)
(citations omitted).
Our Supreme Court has stated:
If it clearly appears that there has been a miscarriage of justice because the jury has
refused to accept credible, uncontradicted evidence where there is no rational basis
for rejecting it, or it is plain to be seen that the jury has acted under a
misconception of proven facts or has misapplied or disregarded the law, or where it
appears that the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice, it is both the
prerogative and the duty of the court to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial.
See Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin. 412 P.2d 615, 617 (Utah 1966) (emphasis added). See also
King v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.. 212 P.2d 692, 696 (Utah 1949) ("duty to grant" new trial
when verdict unsupported by evidence or against weight of evidence).

HARNESS-MEM-NEWTRIAL.02.wpd
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In Bodonv. Suhrmann. 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826 (Utah 1958), the Court held that a
trial court has inherent supervisory powers over jury verdicts, which derive from the trial court's
duty to see that justice is done, and to make corrective orders for that purpose.
In evaluating a motion for new trial, a trial court has "considerable latitude of discretion
in the granting or denying of a motion for a new trial in accordance with his judgment as to what
the ends of justice require.'* Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah 1976). The trial court's
ruling on a motion for a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is clear abuse of
the trial court's discretion. Lembach v. Cox. 639 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1981).
1.

The General Damages Award In The Above-Captioned Matter Was

Excessive and the Product of Passion and/or Prejudice. Under Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, a new trial is warranted where damages are excessive and appear to
have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice. Given the fact that the stipulated
amount of Plaintiff s reasonable and necessary medical expenses was approximately Twelve
Thousand Dollars ($12,000) and that his sole injury was a broken heel, the jury's verdict of Two
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000) in general damages was so grossly excessive to the
injury that it can be said as a matter of law that the verdict must have been arrived at because of
passion or prejudice.
In Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
[A] reviewing court will defer to a jury's damage award unless the award indicates
. . . that the award is so excessive beyond rational justification as to indicate the
effect of improper factors in the determination .

HARNESS-MEM-NEWTRIAL.02.wpd
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Id at 1084 (Citations omitted).
In Mecham v. Foley. 235 P.2d 497 (Utah 1951), the Utah Supreme Court stated that if the
amount of the jury's verdict is so grossly excessive and disproportionate to the injury that it can
be said from such fact alone as a matter of law that the verdict must have been arrived at
because of passion and prejudice, then the trial judge abuses his discretion if he fails to
conditionally grant a new trial. Id. at 499. In this case, the pain and suffering damage award
was excessive beyond rational justification and reflects the effect of passion and prejudice. As
discussed above, what we had in this case is a situation where the Plaintiff sustained a broken
heel. Admittedly, the heel precluded the Plaintiff from pursuing work that required he spend all
day on his feet as was his custom while working for Nabisco's. However, the evidence also
demonstrated that Plaintiff was released to return for work within weeks of the accident
provided he stay off of his heel and, more importantly, the evidence showed that Plaintiff felt so
good he refused further heel surgery offered by Dr. Schow, the treating physician, which
surgery had the potential of reducing any pain Plaintiff felt in his heel.
The end result was a general damage award eighteen (18) times the amount of special
damages, which standing alone evidences that it was given under the influence of passion or
prejudice and demonstrates that Smith's did not receive a fair trial and should be granted a new
trial in the absence of a remittitur of the damages to an amount within proper limits as viewed
by the Court absent passion or prejudice.

HARNESS -MEM-NEWTRIAL. 02 . wpd
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The compensatory award of general damages is clearly excessive given the
evidence presented at trial. In First Security Bank of Utah v. J. B. J. Feedvards, 653 P.2d 591
(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court, in cutting a general damages award in half, stated:
While the finder of fact has wide latitude in determining damages, this Court has
authority to reduce the amount that the trial courts award where "all reasonable
minds would conclude [that] the limits have been exceeded.'

Id. at 598 (citations omitted).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Gumbs v. Pueblo International. Inc., 823 F.2d 768
(3rd Cir. 1987), noted the growing need for courts to review damages awards. In Gumbs, Celia
Gumbs slipped and fell on salad oil in the defendant's store. She sprained her coccyx in the fall.
After her accident, she reported being unable to enjoy sexual relations with her husband, which
allegedly caused their marital relationship to suffer. The marriage eventually ended. Gumbs
sued the defendant and won a jury verdict of $900,000. The district court reduced the award to
$575,000. The Third Circuit held that the damage award, even after remittitur, was excessive.
In ordering a further remittitur, the Third Circuit stated, '%[W]e do not believe that $575,000 is
within even the outermost limits of the range of reasonable and acceptable verdicts for the injury
that plaintiff sustained . . . . " Id at 773. In ordering a further remittitur of damages, the court
stated:
[TJhis court takes note of the increasing willingness of the appellate courts to
review damages awards. There is no doubt that this trend is a response to the
increasingly outrageous amounts demanded by plaintiffs and awarded by juries. A
jury has very broad discretion in measuring damages; nevertheless, a jury may not
abandon analysis for sympath) for a suffering plaintiff and treat an injury as though
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it were a winning lottery ticket. There must be a rational relationship between the specific
injury sustained and the amount awarded.
Id
The jury's award of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000) for pain and suffering
damages in the instant case is grossly excessive. The jury in the instant case was obviously
moved by passion and prejudice for Mr. Harness because there is no rational relationship
between the specific injuries actually sustained by Mr. Harness and the amount awarded by the
jury. The jury's verdict, in and of itself, is the best evidence of the fact that the jury acted from
passion and prejudice.

Accordingly, the Court should grant Smith's motion for a new trial or,

in the alternative, substantially reduce the compensatory award of pain and suffering.
2.

The Damage Award for Lost Income in the Above-Captioned Matter Was

Excessive and the Product of Passion and/or Prejudice. As discussed under Point I, above,
which arguments are incorporated here by reference, there was no competent evidentiary basis
for the jury's award of $680,000 on Plaintiffs claim for lost income and/or diminution in
personal earning capacity. As a matter of law, Plaintiff failed to prove a case because although
he provided some evidence of his annual income before the injury, he did not show the value of
his time after the injur}', or how he attempted to learn new skills and/or seek other employment
that would have allowed him to work despite his injured heel. As indicated above, the
undisputed fact is that Plaintiff injured his heel. Plaintiff did not claim to have sustained an
injury to any other area of his person and, as a result, his decision to not return to the work force
under any circumstance was wholly unwarranted and a clear breach of his duty to mitigate his
damages. Because the jury could not reasonably calculate any difference or diminution in
HARNESS-MEM-NEWTRIAL.02.wpd
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Plaintiffs earning capabilities, Smith's is entitled to a new trial or, in the alternative, a drastic
reduction in the amount awarded to Plaintiff for lost income and/or lost earning capacity.
POINT HI
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT SHOULD REMIT THE AMOUNT OF
DAMAGES TO AN AMOUNT WITHIN THE LIMITS OF PLAINTIFF'S PROOF

As noted above, the court in Gumps v. Pueblo International. Inc., 823 F.2d 768 (3rd Cir.
1987), addressed the increasing need for courts to review damage awards:
[T]his court takes note of the increasing willingness of the appellate courts to
review damage awards. There is no doubt that this trend is a response to the
increasingly outrageous amounts demanded by plaintiffs and awarded by juries. . .
There must be a rational relationship between the specific injuries sustained and
the amount awarded.
See823F.2dat773.
In First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedvards, 650 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982), the
Supreme Court, in cutting a general damages award in half, stated:
While the finder of fact had wide latitude in determining damages, this Court has
authority to reduce the amount that the trial courts award where "all reasonable
minds would conclude [that] the limits have been exceeded."
Id. at 598 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff in this case is a 57 year-old individual who had worked in the grocery industry
for more than thirty (30) years. As a result, he had an extensive and well defined work history.
By his own testimony, he was an "excellent employee." Furthermore, because of his experience
in the grocery industry (e.g., store director, best retail vendor, etc.), he had well developed work
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habits and extensive experience managing himself and other people: traits and qualities that
would be highly beneficial in any field or profession the Plaintiff may have ultimately pursued.
The evidence proved Plaintiffs sole injury was a broken heel and that these injuries
interfered with his ability to stay on his feet all day long. With the exception of employment that
required he stand on his feet, he was otherwise cleared to work.
Nevertheless, the jury awarded plaintiff nearly $680,000 for "lost income and/or lost
earning capacity," which is an element of general damages (see, e.g., 22 Am Jur 2d Damages §
151 ("Loss of earning power is an element of general damages awarded for the loss of ability
thereafter to earn money.")), as well as some $200,000 in general damages, and approximately
$12,000.00 for medical expenses. Under the circumstances, there is no rational relationship
between the specific injuries sustained and the over $800,000.00 in total damages awarded.
Clearly, the jury considered improper factors (e.g., sympathy for plaintiff in making the award
and/or was prejudiced against an insured corporate defendant).
In the interests of justice this Court should (1) reduce the judgment to the medical
expenses that were stipulated to be reasonable and necessary; (2) reduce the general damage
award to something that is rationally related to the Plaintiffs medical damages; and (3) strike
the damages awarded for lost income and/or lost earning capacity because these damages are not
supported by any evidence. In the alternative, defendants request that the Court grant a new
trial.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Smith's respectfully requests the Court to enter its judgment
for defendant as a matter of law on Plaintiffs claim for lost income and/or lost earning capacity
because plaintiff failed to prove the elements of his case. If the Court enters judgment for
defendants, Rule 50(c) requires the Court to mle on the motion for new trial "by determining
whether it should be granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed." The Court
should conditionally grant the motion for new trial in connection with its judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
Alternatively, under Rule 59(a)(5)(6)(7), the Court should grant a new trial because the
verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence and was the product of passion and/or
prejudice.
Alternatively, the Court should grant a remittitur of the verdict to the amounts reasonably
supported by the evidence, or a new trial if Plaintiff will not accept the remittitur.
DATED this /&

day of April, 1998.
RANDALL D. LUND, P.C.

By
Landall D. Lund
ittorney for Defendant Smith's
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
DIVISION ONE - STATE OF UTAH
DAVID W. HARNESS,
Plaintiff
vs.
SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS,

) PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
) OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
) NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
) AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, OR
) MOTION FOR REMITTITUR
)
) Civil No. 950900409PI
)

Defendant.

) Judge Anne M. Stirba

Plaintiff David W. Harness ("Harness") respectfully submits this Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Motion for
New Trial, or Motion for Remittitur.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Smiths Food & Drug Center's, Inc. ("Smith's") argues - not based on the
evidence at trial but on its inaccurate and self-serving characterizations, that the jury's
unanimous verdict should be overturned and that judgment notwithstanding the verdict

("JNOV") or a new trial should be granted or that the Court should order a remittitur. Smith's
motions are not well-taken and should be denied.
DISCUSSION
"Jury verdicts are entitled to great deference." Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 143, 148
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). In Prince v. Peterson. 538 P.2d
1325 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows concerning jury verdicts:
We frequently declare our commitment to the jury system, under which it is the
prerogative of lay citizens to determine questions of fact, both as to liability and
the fixing of damages. . . . The court should give the jury system more than lip
service, by honoring the jury's prerogatives; and by declining to interfere
therewith unless the determinations made are entirely without foundation in
evidence, or are so fragmentary and unsubstantial that no reasonable mind acting
fairly on the evidence could have so concluded.
Id. at 1329. S££ Mel Hardman Productions. Inc. v. Robinson. 604 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah
1979) ("As we have numerous times indicated, the right of trial by jury is one which
should be carefully safeguarded by the courts, and when a party has demanded such a
trial, he is entitled to have the benefit of the jury's findings on issues of fact; and it is not
the trial court's prerogative to disregard or nullify them by making findings of his own.")
In this case, Smith's asks the Court to ignore four days of trial testimony, disregard the
unanimous verdict of the jury, and interfere with the jury's prerogative by entering JNOV.
Alternatively, Smith's requests that this Court start the process all over by vacating the jury's
verdict and ordering a new trial or granting a remittitur. Contrary to Smith's urgings, the jury in
this case properly performed its function. It listened to the evidence, weighed the credibility of
the witnesses, and made a reasoned decision based on the evidence presented.
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In support of its motion seeking JNOV or a new trial or remittitur, Smith's makes a
closing argument. It does not marshal the evidence. Nor does it characterize the evidence in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw inferences in Plaintiff David Harness'
favor, as it must. Rather, Smith's asks the Court to draw all inferences in its favor; Smith's
ignores the considerable evidence that supports the jury's verdict; and Smith's inaccurately
characterizes certain evidence at trial in a most self-serving fashion.
The sole basis for each of Smith's motions is the claim that the jury awarded excessive
damages to Mr. Harness. The heart of Smith's argument is that, following the accident, Mr.
Harness failed to mitigate his damages, and that the jury failed to recognize that purported
failure. Smith's ignores that it, not Mr. Harness, bore the burden at trial of attempting to prove
an alleged failure to mitigate damages.

Smith's also ignores that Mr. Harness introduced

substantial evidence of damages at trial, including evidence as to why he did not seek alternative
employment following his failed attempt to return to Nabisco.
Smith's, on the other hand, introduced nQ evidence at trial that Mr. Harness should have
been able to mitigate his damages but failed to do so. Smith's could have called its own damage
expert; it didn't.

Smith's could have called a vocational rehabilitation specialist; it didn't.

Smith's argued to the jury that Mr. Harness failed to mitigate his damages. Mr. Harness argued
to the jury that he did not fail to mitigate his damages. The jury listened to the arguments,
considered the evidence, and made its decision. There is no basis for disturbing the jury's wellfounded decision.
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An abundance of evidence was introduced at trial that established the propriety of the
jury's unanimous verdict - both with respect to liability and damages.

The jury properly

performed its function. Smith's request that the Court interfere with the jury's verdict, which
request if based solely on Smith's claim that the damages awarded were excessive, should be
denied.
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF "FACTS"
In an effort to support its arguments, Smith's sets forth eleven separately-numbered
paragraphs that it claims to be the "facts" introduced at trial. Smith's mischaracterizes many of
these so-called "facts," and it omits much of the actual evidence that was introduced at trial that
supports the jury's verdict in favor of Mr. Harness. Plaintiff David Harness responds to the
separately-numbered paragraphs of "facts" set forth in Smith's Memorandum as follows:
1.

The "more than $680,000 in lost income" referenced in paragraph one in fact

consisted of actual medical expenses incurred, loss of household services, and lost income and
lost benefits (past and future). Of that total amount, almost half of the damages had been
incurred as of the date of trial due to the fact that the accident happened in 1989. These past
damages involved no discounting back to present value. In fact, were Plaintiff to receive
prejudgment interest on lost income, benefits, and household services between 1989 and the date
of the trial, his special damages would be significantly greater than the amount the jury awarded.
Instead, Plaintiff received prejudgment interest on approximately $12,000 in medical expenses
that already had been incurred as of the date of trial.
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2.

The facts Smith's sets forth in paragraph 2 are accurate, but incomplete. Dr.

Schow testified that he allowed Mr. Harness to attempt to return to work at Nabisco in April of
1990, which Mr. Harness attempted to do. After several months of trying to return to work,
however, Mr. Harness, with the concurrence of Dr. Schow, was forced to stop working.
Evidence at trial, both from Mr. Harness and from Mrs. Harness, established that this was
devastating to Mr. Harness. Dr. Schow testified, and his medical records reflected, that Mr.
Harness was permanently disabled and the only work he could possibly do was desk work. The
parties stipulated that Mr. Harness' medical expenses as of the date of trial were in excess of
$12,000.00. Dr. Schow testified that Mr. Harness may very well benefit from a third operation
on his foot in the future.
3.

David Harness and Darlene Harness testified in detail at trial regarding the efforts

Mr. Harness made to return to work. Smith's assertion that Mr. Harness did not seriously
consider other career possibilities is wrong. Both David and Darlene Harness testified regarding
the many discussions they had about David attempting to retrain for new employment
opportunities and what they had done to check into employment opportunities. Mrs. Harness, in
response to a question from Smith's attorney regarding computer-type work, testified that she
and Mr. Harness had discussed that, but that Mr. Harness had had no training in computers, and
they could not even afford to purchase a computer. When Smith's asked about Mr. Harness
being a real estate agent, Mr. Davis correctly observed that such a job would require walking,
something Mr. Harness could not do.
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Michael Davis testified as Mr. Harness' damage expert. As Mr. Davis pointed out, given
Mr. Harness' age, lack of college education, lack of job skills except in the grocery industry, and
disability, it was reasonable and proper to conclude that Mr. Harness could not return to work.
Smith's may disagree with this evidence. Smith's disagreement, however, obviously did not
prevent the jury from considering the evidence presented and making its own informed decision.
4.

Smith's significantly understates the nature of Mr. Harness' injuries and the

considerable obstacles he faced in attempting to pursue career alternatives. In addition to a
broken right leg, Mr. Harness suffered a shattered (eft calcaneus. Dr. Schow testified that the
injury to Mr. Harness' left heel was one of the worst injuries of that nature he had ever seen, and
that he was required to bring in a second orthopedic surgeon to assist him. Mrs. Harness testified
that Dr. Schow told her after operating on Mr. Harness that Dr. Schow had been unable to "put
Humpty Dumpty back together again." Mr. Harness now walks with a cane or crutches, and he
suffers almost constant pain in his foot and ankle. The pain has been so severe and disabling that
Mr. Harness was forced to undergo a second surgery eight years after the accident to remove
portions of the bones from his left foot.
5-9.

Plaintiffs lost income claim was based on plaintiff being permanently disabled,

including being totally disabled from the type of work he had done in the past. No evidence was
introduced at trial that was contrary to or inconsistent with these facts. In addition, Plaintiff
faced other significant hurdles (including, for example, his lack of schooling, training, lack of
marketable skills and experience, and his age) that led Plaintiff and his wife to conclude that
there was no work available in an alternative career for which he could qualify.
6

Mr. Davis assumed that Mr. Harness' income from Nabisco would have grown at the
conservative rate of 2% per year. He testified that this assumption was reasonable, and he
explained why. The 2% growth rate that Mr. David used was based on the fact that Mr. Harness'
income had grown at a 2% increase per year over the eight to ten years preceding the accident.
Michael Davis testified that the 2% growth rate he projected through the year 2,001 (not 2005 as
Smith's states on page 4 of its memo.), when Mr. Harness would have retired, was, if anything,
conservative. Mr. Davis testified that wages in Utah have grown at higher rate than 2% per year
since the early 1990's, and, as Defendant references in paragraph 9, Utah has been experiencing a
booming economy.
Smith's claim that the evidence at trial established that Mr. Harness' future with Nabisco
"was highly speculative" ($££ ^f 6 of Smith's "facts") mischaracterizes the actual evidence.
Contrary to Smith's assertion, Mr. Black did not testify that all of the people Mr. Harness worked
with at Nabisco had been "organized out." Mr. Black acknowledged only that he and several
other management personnel had been "organized out." There was no testimony that sales
representatives were organized out. At the trial, Smith's attempted to suggest through crossexamination of Mr. Davis that when companies undergo a reorganization, they often lay off older
people in favor of keeping younger people (suggesting that Mr. Harness would have been laid off
because of his age). Mr. Davis testified that he understood (as, undoubtedly, did everyone in the
court room) that it is illegal for companies to discriminate on the basis of age. The'only response
from Smith's counsel was to ask Mr. Davis if he is a lawyer. There was no evidence introduced
at trial that Mr. Harness may or would have been laid off.
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Mr. Davis testified that Mr. Harness' employment records demonstrated that he was one
of Nabisco's best sales representatives; that he had one of Nabisco's most lucrative sales routes;
that Mr. Harness had received various awards and recognition based on his achievements at
work; and that there was no evidence of which he was aware that Mr. Harness would be in
jeopardy of losing his job. Mr. Davis testified that, in his experience, companies do not lay off
their highest performing employees.
Mr. Harness testified that he was very secure in his job and was one of Nabisco's highest
performing sales representatives. He testified that he had been assigned to a new sales area - one
of the best in the region, only six months before he was injured, and that he had received a
prestigious award from Nabisco based on his excellent job performance just a short time before
the accident.
10.

The "facts" Smith's alleges in paragraph 10 are irrelevant. Plaintiff never claimed

Smith's had a duty to train him.
11.

Smith's assertion in paragraph 11 that Mr. Harness "fell from a position on the

shelves where he always stood, regardless of whether he used the ladder or not," not only is
irrelevant, it is incorrect. Mr. Harness testified that he had climbed on the shelves before. He
further testified, however, that on the date of the accident at issue, he wanted to use the ladder.
This fact is undisputed. Both Mr. Harness and Mr. Beers testified about Mr. Harness asking Mr.
Beers to bring the ladder over on the date of the accident, and the fact that no ladder was
available. Moreover, Mr. Harness testified that the day of the accident was different than other
occasions when he had climbed on the rack. On the day of the accident, there was more than the
8

usual back stock that had to be put in the space assigned to Nabisco in the back room because it
was the day after a holiday. The high shelf space therefore was much fuller than normal, leaving
virtually no room to stand on the shelf. Mr. Harness testified that he wanted the ladder so that
when the shelf began to fill up, he would be able to stand on the ladder to finish off the shelf.
Moreover, the fact that Mr. Harness had stood on the dangerously high shelf space before
and not been injured certainly does not somehow justify or excuse Smith's from its negligence,
including that of having assigned outside vendors dangerous space in the back room and having
failed to provide adequate and sufficient access to the shelf space it assigned to outside vendors.
Several individuals, including Smith's own employees, acknowledged that Smith's was obligated
to provide safe access to the dangerously high shelf space - something Smith's failed to do. In
addition, the undisputed evidence was that other grocery stores either assigned storage space to
outside vendors that could be reached from the ground or provided equipment (hydraulic lifts or
runway stairs) that made product storage and retrieval safe. Smith's was the only store that
forced vendors to store and retrieve products twelve feet above a cement floor on a step ladder.
ARGUMENT
The jury in this case listened to four days of testimony. The jury was conscientious and
attentive throughout the trial. The arguments Smith's now makes are the same arguments it
made to the jury. The fact that the jury did not accept Smith's arguments does not, as Smith's
now seems to suggest, mean the jury was wrong. Mr. Harness presented a wealth of evidence,
including a significant amount of evidence through Smith's own employees and agents, such as
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Mr. Morris, Mr. Huber, Mr. McDonald, and Mr. Parry, that supported his claims and the jury's
verdict.
The foundation for Smith's arguments seeking JNOV, a new trial, or remittitur is not
based on evidence, but rather on argument without regard to evidence. The jury in this case
heard the evidence, listened to the arguments, and made a proper, well-reasoned decision. The
damages it awarded, which form the sole basis for Smith's attacks, were rational and well within
the jury's prerogative. The jury's decision should not be overturned or altered.
I.

SMITH'S IS NOT ENTITLED TO JNOV.
A party is not entitled to a JNOV unless, viewing all of the evidence and indulging all

inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no evidence to support the
jury's determination. $££, e ^ , Gold Standard. Inc. v. Gettv Oil Co.. 915 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah
1996) (;;A j.n.o.v. can be granted only when the losing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.") "In determining whether competent evidence supports the verdict, we accept as true all
testimony and reasonable inferences flowing therefrom that tend to prove [the nonmoving
party's] case, and we disregard all conflicts and evidence that tend to disprove its case." Id.; see
also Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau. Inc.. 832 P.2d 62, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); DeBry v.
Cascade Enterprises, 879 P.2d 1253, 1359 (Utah 1994).1 "A motion [for j.n.o.v.] should be
denied if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions on the issue in controversy." id.;
McCloud v. Baum. 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977).

1

The standard is the same for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as it is for directed verdict. See, e g . Heslop
v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828, 838-39 (Utah 1992).
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In determining a motion for JNOV, the Court does not weigh the evidence, and the
weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are within the jury's sole province.
E.g.. Winters v. W.S. Hatch Company. 546 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1976). Also, "[i]n passing on a
motion for a j.n.o.v., a trial court has no latitude and must be correct." Crookston v. Fire
Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991).
In support of its argument that the Court should grant JNOV, Smith's makes no argument
that it was not liable for Plaintiffs injuries; it does not claim Plaintiff was not injured; and it does
not claim Plaintiff could return to work at his old job - indeed, Smith's acknowledges Mr.
Harness could not return to work for Nabisco. It also acknowledges that he physically could not
do the type of work Mr. Harness had done his entire life. Instead, Smith's argues that Mr.
Harness failed to mitigate his damages and asks this Court, as a matter of law, to find that
Smith's sustained its burden of demonstrating that Mr. Harness failed to reasonably mitigate his
damages.2

Even then, however, Smith's cites no evidence as to the amount, if any, it claims

Mr. Harness purportedly could have earned, given his age, lack of training, lack of education,
and lack of experience other than in the grocery business, in some other hypothetical career.
Smith introduced m evidence at trial that Mr. Harness could have worked at some other job
given the many obstacles he faced or that he in any way failed to reasonably attempt to mitigate
his damages.

To the contrary, all Smith's did at trial was to have Mr. Davis perform a

calculation of how much Mr. Harness would have earned, assuming he could have secured a

2

Even were Smith's right, which it is not, its argument at most supports a claim for remittitur, not for JNOV.
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minimum wage job. That obviously does not constitute evidence that Mr. Harness could have
obtained such a job or that he failed to reasonably attempt to mitigate his damages.
Dr. Schow testified that Mr. Harness could not return to his work at Nabisco, and that the
only work he physically could do was a desk job. Dr. Schow did not testify that Mr. Harness
could obtain such a job - only that he physically could work at such a job.
Mr. Harness testified why he did not return to work after he attempted and failed to return
to his work at Nabisco. Mrs. Harness testified about their discussions and efforts relating to Mr.
Harness returning to work. Both testified about the devastation the family experienced when
they concluded that Mr. Harness could not return to work.

Mr. Davis also testified in

considerable detail why he determined it was reasonable to conclude that Mr. Harness could not
return to work.
On the other hand, no one testified that Mr. Harness could or should have obtained some
kind of employment to mitigate his damages. No one testified or offered an opinion as to how
long it would have taken Mr. Harness to be trained in some kind of new occupation, or even
whether he could be trained.

No one testified regarding whether Mr. Harness could have

returned to work at all, and, even if he could, how long it would have taken Mr. Harness to find a
job, how much or how little he likely would have earned, or how much it would have cost to
retrain Mr. Harness in a new job.
There is no valid argument that Mr. Harness did not suffer an impairment of
income and loss of wages as a result of the accident. Mr. Harness had an excellent job. It
took him over 20 years to reach the point in his career where he was awarded one of
12

Nabisco's most lucrative sales routes. Mr. Harness was out of work for months following
the accident, and there is no dispute that he could not return to his career with Nabisco.
Mr. Harness testified that, following the accident, after looking at the job market,
analyzing what skills he had to offer, and consulting with his wife, he and his wife
reached the reasonable conclusion that his skills were not marketable. Mr. Davis offered
supporting testimony.
Smith's argument that Mr. Harness suffered no loss of wages and benefits or no
impairment of income given his age, training, schooling, and disability is not believable on its
face, even disregarding the testimony of the Harness' and that of Mr. Davis.
As of the date he first lost wages, 1991 (after rehabilitating, then attempting
unsuccessfully to return to work at Nabisco, and then again rehabilitating), Mr. Harness was 55
years old. He has no marketable job skills or experience. Combining each of these factors - age,
lack of education, and lack of marketable skills, with the disability he suffered requiring David
Harness to leave the industry in which he had spent his entire adult life, the jury's conclusion that
Mr. Harness suffered economic damages, and that Smith's did not establish that Mr. Harness
failed to mitigate his damages, was entirely proper and well supported by the evidence at trial.
Smith's request for JNOV therefore should be denied.
II.

SMITH'S IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL.

Smith's claims that the general damages and special damages in this case were excessive,
and thus the Court should grant a new trial. Smith's again attempts to characterize and describe
evidence that it believes supports its position while ignoring all other evidence presented at trial.
13
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In short, Smith's asks this Court to invade the province of the jury, make determinations
of credibility in favor of Smith's, reject testimony and other evidence that supports the jury's
verdict, and accept Smith's version of the alleged facts that (1) &re inconsistent with or
inaccurately describe the actual evidence at trial; (2) are incomplete; and/or (3) that were never
even placed into evidence at trial.
"Motions for new trials are generally not favored in the law, in part because it is costly
and inefficient to hold multiple trials on the same cause of action." Davis v. Grand County
Service Area. 905 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817
P.2d 789, 803 (Utah 1991)). The Utah Supreme Court cautioned in Goddard v. Hickman. 685
P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984), that new trials should be granted only in "rare cases." When the
motion for a new trial is based on insufficiency of the evidence, "the trial court may grant a new
trial only if the jury's verdict is so contrary to the manifest weight that the trial judge 'cannot in
good conscience permit it to stand.'" Id. at 532 (citations omitted). "A trial court cannot grant a
new trial if there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict for either party and the judge merely
disagrees with the judgment of the jury." Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789,
799 n.9 (1991).3 Accord Goddard. 684 P.2d at 532 ("Even though a trial judge may disagree
with a verdict, mere disagreement is not sufficient reason to order a new trial.") Moreover,
because "[a] second trial is not without its costs in terms of scarce litigant and judicial resources
and the possible unavailability of witnesses or the erosion of their memories[,] . . . the trial

3

The Supreme Court in Crookston noted that a new trial is proper pursuant to rule 59(a)(6) only if the trial judge
"can reasonably conclude that the verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence or that there is insufficient
evidence to justify the verdict;'). Crookston. 817 P.2d at 816 n.9. "If there be an evidentiary basis for the jury's
decision, the denial of the new trial must be affirmed." McCloud. 569 P.2d at 1127.
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judge's prerogative to grant a new trial on an evidentiary basis under Rule 59(a)(6) [alleged
insufficiency of evidence to support the verdict] should be exercised with forbearance." Nelson
v.Trujillo. 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982). Accord Goddard. 685 P.2d at 532.
Addressing damage awards, which is the sole basis on which Smith's seeks a new trial,
the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
As long as there is some rational basis for the damage award, it is the wrongdoer
who must assume the risk of some uncertainty. Where there is evidence of the
fact of damage, a defendant may not escape liability because the amount of
damage cannot be proven with precision.
Bastian v. King. 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983). In Rees v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 808
P.2d 1069, 1079 (Utah 1991), the Court held: "We uphold jury verdicts awarding damages as
long as there is some rational basis for the award." And in Duffy v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.. 218
P.2d 1080 (Utah 1950), the Utah Supreme Court observed:
The verdict here was admittedly liberal. But the mere fact that it was more than
another jury, or more than this Court, might have given, or even more than the
evidence justified, does not conclusively show that it was the result of passion,
prejudice, or corruption on the part of the j u r y . . . .
Duffy. 218 P.2d at 1080 (cited with approval in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d
789 (Utah 1991).) See aka Exxon Corp. v. Alvey. 690 P.2d 733, 741 (Alaska 1984) ("mere
excessiveness does not warrant the conclusion that the verdict was the result of emotion,
prejudice or improper motive on the part of the jurors"); Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr.
Co.. 701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1985) ( ; To justify a new trial for excessive damages . . ., the
damage award must be more than generous; it must be clearly excessive on any rational view of

the evidence." (citations omitted)). Finally, in Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995), the
Utah Supreme Court observed: "Juries are generally allowed wide discretion in the assessment
of damages. We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's findings and will
uphold its calculation of damages so long as there is competent evidence to sustain it." Id at
1386 (citing cases).
In this case, the jury's verdict was not excessive or even particularly liberal. There is a
rational basis for the jury's damage award, and it should not be disturbed.
A.

The Jury's Award of Special Damages Was Not Excessive.

Michael Davis presented expert testimony at trial regarding Mr. Harness' economic
damages. Mr. Davis is a licensed Certified Public Accountant, has extensive experience in
performing damage calculations, has testified in court as a recognized damage expert on many
occasions, and was qualified in this case as a damage expert without objection from Smith's.
During direct examination, Mr. Davis explained in detail the analysis he performed of
Mr. Harness' economic losses to the jury. He presented a detailed chart to the jury setting forth
his calculations.

The jury awarded special damages in an amount equal to Mr. Davis'

calculations.
Smith's does not claim in requesting a new trial that Mr. Davis made improper
calculations or made improper assumptions. Nor did Mr. Davis admit on cross-examination that
his assumptions were mistaken or wrong. In fact, Smith's cross-examination of Mr. Davis
consisted principally of asking Mr. Davis whether, if certain of his assumptions were substituted
with assumptions suggested by Smith's, which assumptions were completely lacking in
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supporting evidence, his conclusions regarding the amount of damages would be different. Mr.
Davis testified that he believed his assumptions were reasonable, correct, and that, based on his
expert opinion, he believed his calculation of Mr. Harness' special damages was reasonable and
conservative.
Smith's curiously argues that Mr. Harness "failed to show the value of his time after the
injury, or how he attempted to learn new skills and/or seek other employment that would have
allowed him to work despite his injured heel." (Smith's Memo, at p. 15). Smith's concludes that
"[b]ecause the jury could not reasonably calculate any difference or diminution in Plaintiffs
earning capabilities, Smith's is entitled to a new trial . . . ." or reduction in the damage award.
(Id. at 16). The fallacy of Smith's argument is two-fold.
First, a significant amount of evidence was presented to the jury regarding Mr. Harness'
post-accident economic damages. Mr. Davis testified that, in his opinion, it was reasonable to
conclude that Mr. Harness could not return to work after he unsuccessfully attempted to return to
work at Nabisco. He explained several reasons for this conclusion.
Mr. Harness testified about his desire to return to work, his efforts to do so, and the
factors that led he and his wife to ultimately conclude that he could not reasonably return to
work. Although Smith's designated a damage expert and vocational expert, Smith's did not call
either of these people to testify at trial. Now, Smith's attempts to characterize the facts and make
a jury argument (in fact, the same argument it made to the jury) that Mr. Harness did not
reasonably mitigate. Mr. Harness explained to the jury what he did, and he explained the major
obstacles to obtaining alternative employment. The most Smith's could argue in response is that
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Mr. Harness perhaps could have obtained a minimum wage job somewhere. On even this point,
however, Smith's presented no supporting evidence.
Mrs. Harness testified, consistently with Mr. Harness, that they determined that, given
Mr. Harness' disability, lack of education, lack of training, lack of experience, the psychological
impact Mr. Harness suffered to his image and feeling of self-worth, the constant pain he
experiences, and the relatively limited remaining work life, Mr. Harness could not return to
work.
Smith's claim that there was no evidence of special damages in the form of future lost
income, particularly in light of the testimony of Mr. Davis and Mr. and Mrs. Harness, ignores
what actually happened at trial.
Second, Smith's, whether mistakenly or intentionally, attempts to shift its burden to
Plaintiff. Smith's, not David Harness, bore the burden at trial to attempt to establish that Mr.
Harness unreasonably failed to mitigate his damages. See, e.g.. Pratt v. Board of Education of
Uintah County School District. 564 P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977) ("[T]he burden is upon the party
whose wrongful act caused the damages to prove anything in diminution thereof." (citing
numerous cases)); John Call Engineering. Inc. v. Manti City Corp.. 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) ("[T]he burden of proving plaintiff has not mitigated its damages and that its award
should be correspondingly reduced is on defendant.").4 Smith's not only failed to carry this
burden, it introduced no evidence whatsoever at trial of any such alleged failure on the part of

4

Smith's recognized its burden from the outset when, in its Answer and Jury Demand, it pled as a Sixth Defense as
follows: uAs an affirmative defense, Smith's alleges that the Plaintiff has failed to reasonably mitigate his damages,
if any."
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David Harness to mitigate his damages. Instead, Smith's simply makes the very same argument
it made to the jury. The jury obviously was not convinced, and Smith's unsupported arguments
do not justify interference with the jury's verdict.
The jury properly exercised its judgment and discretion in awarding special damages.
The verdict was not based on passion or prejudice.

Indeed, the jury accepted Mr. Davis'

testimony and calculations regarding special damages. There obviously was a rational basis on
which the jury could find special damages, and the jury so found.
B.

The Jury's Award of General Damages Was Not Excessive.

Smith's presents various arguments with respect to its claim that the jury awarded
excessive general damages, several of which are nothing short of nonsensical. For example,
Smith's claims that Mr. Harness was released to return to work "within weeks of the accident,
provided he stay off his heel." (Smith's memo, at p. 13). The evidence at trial was that Mr.
Harness was in a cast for weeks following the accident, and he was not allowed to even attempt
to return to work for months following the accident.5 When he attempted to go back to work,
which Mr. Harness desperately wanted to do, he experienced practically unbearable pain and
swelling in his foot and ankle and, ultimately, was unable to continue working.
Smith's curiously, albeit incorrectly, argues that the jury awarded general damages that
were "eighteen (18) times the amount of special damages, which standing alone evidence that is

5

Smith's assertion is even contrary to paragraph 2 of its own factual statement, wherein Smith's acknowledges that
Mr. Harness was not released to attempt to return to work until "in or about April, of 1990," seven months after the
September, 1989 accident.
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was given under the influence of passion or prejudice . . ." (Smith's memo, at p. 13).6 Smith's
cites no case or other legal authority to support this claim. There is none. Apparently, Smith's
believes that if Plaintiffs leg had been amputated, and it had cost $1,000 to perform the
amputation, an award of general damages of $18,000 would be grossly excessive. Such claims
are completely unsupported by fact or law and defy common sense and reason. They also seek to
invade the province of the jury.
The evidence at trial was that Mr. Harness suffers constant pain; that years after the
accident he received injections of pain killers, had a SQcond operation to remove portions of the
bones from his foot, and even now faces a third surgery that will lock his foot in place. Yet
Smith claims that "Plaintiff felt so good he refused further heel surgery offered by Dr. Schow,
the treating physician, which surgery had the potential of reducing any pain Plaintiff felt in his
heel." (Smith's memo, at p. 13). This assertion not only is completely baseless, it borders, and
perhaps crosses, the line of the ridiculous. Dr. Schow explained at trial the nature of the
operation to which Smith's refers. The operation would be a fusion of Mr. Harness' left foot, an
operation that would result in Mr. Harness foot being completely locked in place, leaving Mr.
Harness unable to move his foot at all. Dr. Schow testified that, even with the operation, Mr.
Harness likely would not be relieved of all pain, and he might not be relieved of any of his pain.7

6

Contrary to Smith's argument, the jury did not award Mr. Harness general damages that were eighteen times the
amount of special damages. In fact, the jury's award of general damages ($200,000.00) was kss then its award of
special damages ($681,865.70). See Special Verdict Form, Question No. 6.
7

Smith's also ignores that such an operation would be very expensive, thereby significantly reducing its selfcreated "18 to 1" ratio of general damages to medical expenses.
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It is entirely understandable that Mr. Harness would want to forego such an operation if he in any
way can do so.
The evidence at trial was that Mr. Harness was physically very active before the accident.
He loved to water ski and snow ski. He jogged almost every day, five or six days a week, for
several years before the accident.
grandchildren.

He camped and hiked with his wife, children, and

He enjoyed regularly going on walks with his wife.

He engaged in many

physical activities, none of which he can now enjoy. Mr. Harness cannot walk more than a short
distance without experiencing intense pain. He must always use at least a cane to walk, and
sometimes crutches. His life as he once knew it has been taken away. Mr. Harness experiences
constant pain. He suffers the psychological impact of having lost his job. He has lost self
esteem and has felt worthless, as evidenced by the statement to his wife that she would have been
better off had he been killed in the accident. Yet, according to Smith's, $200,000 in general
damages is excessive.
Smith's claim that the "jury's verdict, in and of itself, is the best evidence of the fact that
the jury acted from passion and prejudice" (Smith's memo, at p. 15) is instructive. Given the
debilitating and permanent nature of Mr. Harness' injuries, as well as the disruption to his life;
the loss of enjoyment of life; and the constant pain and suffering he experiences, the jury's
verdict speaks for itself. The verdict certainly does not speak of passion or prejudice, however.
To the contrary, it reflects a well-reasoned, rational award from eight jurors who heard and
understood the evidence presented to them.
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III.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT REMIT THE JURY'S AWARD OF DAMAGES.
The jury's damage award, both as to special and general damages, was well supported by

the evidence at trial. The special damages the jury awarded Mr. Harness, consisting of medical
expenses, lost wages and benefits (past and future), and loss of household services, were
consistent with the evidence presented at trial through Plaintiff, his wife, and through Plaintiffs
expert, Mr. Davis. Smith's claim that there was no evidence to support these damages simply
ignores the abundance of evidence that was, in fact, introduced at trial. And, as repeatedly noted
above, Smith's introduced no evidence whatsoever at trial to demonstrate any failure by Mr.
Harness to reasonably mitigate damages.
It is within the exclusive province of the jury to determine the amount of damages a party
has suffered due to the negligence of a defendant. As long as there is some rational basis in the
evidence for the award, which there plainly was in this case, the jury has wide discretion to
determine what damages are appropriate. The jury properly made that determination here.
Remittitur is inappropriate under these circumstances.
CONCLUSION
JNOV is inappropriate based on the evidence introduced at trial that supports the jury's
verdict. Smith's improperly relies on characterizations and arguments it draws from alleged
evidence in arguing for a new trial. Smith's ignores and mischaracterizes key evidence; it cites as
"evidence" alleged facts that were not even introduced at the trial; it attempts to improperly shift
burdens it failed to carry to Plaintiff; and it asks the Court to invade the province of the jury.

22

The jury in this case carefully listened to and assessed the evidence and made an
informed, well-reasoned decision.

The jury's unanimous verdict should not be disturbed.

Plaintiff David Harness respectfully requests that the Court deny Smith's Motions.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Plaintiff Davis W. Harness respectfully requests that the Court grant oral argument with
respect to Smith's Motions and Plaintiffs opposition thereto.
DATED this H

day of April, 1998.
JOHNSON & HATCH
Mark F. James
Paul C. Drecksel

,M

By:

UIQAAKS
Attorneys for Plaintiff/David W. Harness

SU?

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be hand-delivered
this

of April, 1998, to the following:
Randall D. Lund
505 East 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102-2007
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH Tn»Yd Juti c*j o

OCf 2 B 1998

—00O00-

David Harness,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
Smith's Food and Drug
Centers, Inc.,
Defendant Appellant.

SALT LA ^.COUNTY

No.

981418 XJ
950900409PI

"'"• :

—00O00—

ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon appellant's Motion to Extend Time to
Appeal or to Amend the Docketing Statement filed on September 22,1998. A Response
was filed October 16,1998.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Extend Time to Appeal, or in the
alternative, to Amend the Docketing Statement is denied. The date written into the date
stamp on the order appealed from is the official date of the entry of judgment. Smith's
is directed to limit its issues on appeal to those concerning the denial of its post judgment
motions.
BY THE COURT:

Jul it

10

Date

jl£^u^i//,
J^eonard H. Russon
Justice

St'

